Research On Environmental Protection Behavior And Performance Of Local Governments In China

In China,the state is the leader in promoting environmental protection,and governments at all levels are the core participants in environmental protection.On the one hand,local governments bear the heavy responsibility of economic and social development,on the other hand,they have the responsibility to protect the environment and improve environmental quality.As the chief executive of the local government,local government officials also have dual goals.On the one hand,they manage and serve the affairs of their jurisdictions.On the other hand,they seek the political future of individuals.In this context,we need to focus on the environmental protection motivation of local governments and how the motivation contributes to the corresponding environmental protection behavior and performance.Because the motivation cannot be directly observed,this article further analyzes the local government’s environmental protection motivation by studying the strategic interaction and corresponding performance of the local government’s environmental protection behavior.In order to analyze the motives behind the environmental protection behavior of local governments,this article divides environmental protection projects into visible environmental protection projects and non-visible environmental protection projects.Based on the data at the provincial and municipal government levels in China,from the perspective of strategic interaction the environmental protection behavior and performance were evaluated.First of all,this article clarifies the research background and significance,and sorts out relevant literature on environmental protection behavior and strategic interaction of environmental protection behavior.Secondly,this article combs the relevant theories of strategic interaction between localities and builds a theoretical basis for the causes of strategic interaction between local governments in environmental protection.Thirdly,through the data of time and space,this article visually presents and analyzes the current status of visible environmental protection projects and non-visible environmental protection projects in China.Next,based on the sample data of local government panels,this paper uses three spatial panel models to analyze the spatial interaction of environmental protection strategies among local governments in China,the spatial analysis of the relationship between environmental performance and the causes of strategic interaction of environmental protection behaviors have been empirically tested.Finally,the conclusion of this article is drawn and relevant suggestions are put forward for China’s environmental protection.Through the research in this article,we have drawn the following conclusions:1.there is indeed strategic interaction between environmental protection behaviors among local governments,and there is also a significant spatial correlation in environmental performance.2.For different environmental protection projects,the strategic interaction of local governments ’environmental protection behaviors is different: the environmental protection behaviors and performance of visible environmental protection projects objectively form a“top-to-top competition” trend,and the environmental protection behavior and performance of non-visible environmental protection projects objectively formed the trend of “bottom competition”.3.The reason for the differentiation of strategic interactions and results of environmental interactions among local governments is political incentives.Visible environmental protection projects can receive widespread attention as a “signal” for local officials to demonstrate their achievements to higher levels.The promotion of non-visible environmental protection projects is generally ignored.4.The strategic interaction of environmental protection behavior among local governments from the perspective of visibility is scale competition.5.The current economic development is conducive to promoting environmental protection behaviors and performance.Objective needs have promoted the development of environmental protection behaviors,but environmental protection performance is still difficult to meet the objective needs of society.