The Improvement Of Ecological Compensation Performance In National Key Ecological Functional Area Of Shanxi Province

Environmental problems are increasingly becoming the key factor restricting the sustainable development of China’s social economy.The deep-seated contradiction of this problem lies in the mismatch between the cost of ecological resources protection and the ecological output.Take the national key ecological function zones as an example.According to the National Plan for Key Ecological Function Zones,the national key ecological function zones are restricted for development.The protection and construction of ecological environment will not only bring direct costs to the local government,but also cause huge indirect costs due to the obstacles to local economic construction.Only by effectively covering these costs can national key ecological function zones be protected for a long time.Realizing this problem,the Ministry of Finance began to allocate ecological compensation funds with the nature of special transfer payment to the counties(districts)of the national key ecological functional zones in 2008,with the purpose of encouraging local governments to carry out ecological environmental protection and construction work more actively and effectively.Over the past decade and more,the central government’s transfer payments to key ecological function zones have increased year by year,from an initial 6.6 billion yuan to 72.1 billion yuan in 2018.It has become the focus of people’s attention whether the investment of this fund can bring about the improvement of ecological environment quality.Therefore,it is necessary to carry out research on ecological compensation performance.First of all,the eco-environmental quality index and transfer payment data of counties in shanxi Province from 2010 to 2017 were used to test their eco-compensation performance.Test results show that the coefficient of ecological compensation funds for is under 1%significance level,the ecological environment quality of elasticity was 0.1498,indicating that the use of ecological compensation funds to a certain extent,to improve ecological environmental quality,but a 1%increase ecological compensation funds,the ecological environment quality is only increased by 0.1498%,that ecological compensation performance is not high;From the regression results of the control variables,the coefficient of the industrial structure is negative at the significance level of 1%,indicating that the increase of the proportion of the secondary industry will hinder the improvement of the ecological environment quality,and the cultivated land area and residents’consumption level fail to pass the significance test.In general,the ecological compensation funds of national key ecological function zones have a certain promoting effect on the improvement of local ecological environment quality,but the performance of ecological compensation is not high.However,in order to promote the improvement of ecological environment quality,we must be clear about the reasons for the low performance of ecological compensation.Therefore,from the perspective of incomplete contract,this paper tries to find a reasonable explanation for the low performance of ecological compensation.Analysis:in the signing and implementation of ecological compensation system in the process of both parties exist,such as the limited rationality,opportunism,transaction costs and asymmetric information,the uncertainty of the future,the terms of the contract shall not confirmatory factors,makes the ecological compensation system is unable to complete-for all matters in advance,cause the system is actually an incomplete contract.Rip-off is one of the core problems of incomplete contracts.In the implementation of ecological compensation system,the central government in advance to do a lot of specific investment,local governments in accordance with the contract requirements for ecological environment protection and construction,however,due to the incompleteness of ecological compensation contract and specific investment can take up from quasi rent,will stimulate the conservationists rip-off opportunistic behavior,and weaken the investor beforehand specificity investment incentives,eventually lead to the situation of poor ecological compensation performance.Therefore,eliminating or mitigating the rip-off behavior of eco-conservationists is very important to improve the performance of ecological compensation.Then this paper designs a model of the property right allocation of ecological resources,and tries to alleviate the biped behavior of the eco-protectors by means of the residual control right allocation advocated by the property right theory,so as to realize the incentive effect on their specific investment.The model mainly differentiates the level of ecologists’ specific investment in the case of private property rights and public property rights,and compares it with the optimal state of society.Results show that compared with public property rights,private property rights under the conservationists cost innovation effort level and technical innovation efforts level more and more close to the optimal state,social and public property rights under the two efforts level are low,so the private property right is more advantageous to realize the ecological protectors specificity investment incentive effect.Further,this paper introduced the government investment level,found that conservationists technology innovation efforts with the government investment has positive correlation relationship,increase government investment to further improve the level of technology innovation efforts,make it closer to the optimal state of society,the reason is that the increase of the investment level makes conservationists have sufficient funds to make up for by the cost of ecological construction,this view is theoretically proved li guoping(2017)research conclusion.Therefore,compared with public property rights,ecologists under private property rights have stronger incentives for specific investment,which can effectively alleviate their rip-off behavior,which is a second-best choice.At the same time,the government should continue to increase the input of ecological compensation funds,so that the level of technological innovation efforts of eco-protectors will be closer to the optimal level of society,so as to further improve the performance of ecological compensation.