Research On Timing Decision Of Adoption Of Low Carbon Technology In Supply Chain Under Uncertain Environment

In recent years,with the human activities,especially the large-scale combustion of fossil fuels such as coal,the content of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased year by year,resulting in frequent climate disasters,increasing greenhouse effect,and environmental problems are increasingly affecting and restricting the economy.The key factor of social development and human survival.In the report of the 19 th National Congress,the concept of "consisting on the harmonious coexistence between man and nature" was put forward.In order to alleviate the threat of the environment to human survival and development,enterprises should take the initiative to undertake social responsibility for improving the environment,optimize the industrial chain emissions of production and manufacture,and reduce carbon dioxide.Emissions,promote the construction of low-carbon supply chains,improve atmospheric environmental problems,and promote economic and ecological development.For the supply chain,adopting low-carbon technologies will gain additional carbon emissions revenues and market advantages,but at the same time face uncertainties in the carbon trading market,government carbon tax policies and competitive pressures.For the government,the development of a scientific carbon tax policy will limit supply chain carbon emissions to a certain extent and stimulate the enthusiasm of its low-carbon investment.Under the influence of comprehensive factors,the timing of adoption of low-carbon technologies has become the key to studying low-carbon investment decisions in the supply chain.This paper will build an evolutionary game model adopted by supply chain low-carbon technology and a collaborative decision-making model adopted by supply chain low-carbon technology,the latter including collaborative cooperation model and Stackelberg game decision-making model.In the context of carbon trading,two asymmetric enterprises in the upstream and downstream of the supply chain face the same low-carbon technology adoption opportunities,compete with each other and play low-carbon technology investments,and seek to reduce carbon emissions and optimize returns.Therefore,in constructing the evolutionary game model of low-carbon technology in supply chain enterprises,in addition to analyzing the impact of the uncertainty of the carbon trading market on the timing of low-carbon investment,it is also necessary to consider the difference in investment costs between the upstream and downstream enterprises.The impact of competitive behavior on each other’s decisions.In the end,according to the game decision results of the two companies,there will be three different investment sequences: sequential investment,preemptive investment and simultaneous investment.Based on the previous chapter’s research on the investment order of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain,the order of adoption of low-carbon technologies for upstream and downstream enterprises will be limited.Under the background of the carbon trading policy,the constraints of the carbon tax policy are introduced.Firstly,based on a single supply chain that integrates manufacturers and retailers,and builds a basic decision-making model for collaborative adoption of low-carbon technologies,using real options to evaluate the expected benefits of low-carbon technologies and deriving low-carbon investments.The minimum adoption of carbon prices,the calculation of the optimal investment opportunity.Then build the Stackelberg game decision-making model of the secondary supply chain composed of upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers,and study the income distribution and cost allocation within the secondary supply chain when the upstream manufacturers adopt the leader of low-carbon technology.The equilibrium result of maximizing the overall return of the supply chain,and comparing the optimal decision-making situation of the supply chain enterprise and the optimal adoption of the carbon price under the Stackelberg game decision-making situation.Through comparative analysis and numerical simulation,the following conclusions are obtained:(1)In the option game decision-making model of upstream and downstream asymmetric companies,the following conclusions are obtained: When the two companies have strong first-mover effects and occupy a dominant position,the companies will compete with each other for low-carbon technology adoption.Enterprises will form a preemptive equilibrium situation;the cost of a company with acost advantage alone is greater than the benefit of the two when it is jointly invested,and its income decreases with the "free-rider" companies.In the end,the low-carbon investment decisions of the two companies formed a sequential equilibrium situation.When the first-mover advantage is small,the two companies’ investment initiative is weak,and a simultaneous investment equilibrium will be formed.(2)In the collaborative decision-making model of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain,the following conclusions are drawn: In the synergy model,the carbon emission rights price has a certain volatility,and the income from the adoption of low-carbon technology in the supply chain is greater than that in the unadopted,low-carbon technology.The adoption timing is related to the carbon emission reduction rate;in the Stackelberg game decision model,the low carbon adoption timing is related to the carbon tax rate,the cost sharing ratio,and the income transfer payment ratio;the optimal adoption price of the supply chain in the Stackelberg game is higher than Collaborative decision making situation.