A Study On The Barriers Blocking The Implementaion Of Hazardous Chemichals Enterprises’ Layout Adjustment Policy In Shanghai

With the rapid development of economy and acceleration of the urbanization process,the security threats to the residents and public facilities nearby,caused by the original layout of the hazardous chemicals enterprises are becoming more and more obvious.As an important public policy aimed at reducing the risk of urban security,ever since the year of 2009,Shanghai municipal government has taken the lead in formulating and implementing the policy of hazardous chemicals enterprises’ layout adjustment in China.After several years’ efforts,most of dangerous chemicals production,storage enterprises outside the “104 blocks”(namely 104 industrial blocks identified by Shanghai Municipal Economic and Information Commission)have been adjusted(shut down,converted or relocated),and the policy has achieved remarkable results.However,in the course of the policy implementation,various resistances from county governments and dangerous chemicals enterprises make policy not fully implemented before the deadline.This thesis will study theproblems in the implementation of the policy,and analyze the reasons from the perspective of the game,so as to find out ways to solve the problems.This paper firstly introduces the basic information of Shanghai dangerous chemicals enterprises’ layout adjustment policy,its implementation,and specific problems which mainly includes: lack of legal basis,high adjustment cost,difficulties for enterprises to move into “104 blocks”,insufficient fiscal support,reluctance from county governments,and the necessity for some enterprises to retain.The forms of the policy implementation hindrance can be summed up as,for the county government,wait-and-see type,selective type,replaceable type and for the enterprises,the resisting type.By establishing a simple non-cooperative game model to analyze the game process between municipal and county governments,and analyzing the game between enterprises and county governments and how they form the "collusion",the thesis explores the reasons behind the non-cooperative game and policy block: the demands of the policy-related subjects are different,and the supply of the systems is insufficient and invalid.Finally,the thesis provides the suggestions to solve the problem: to resolve the interest conflicts of game participants by improving their value identification of the policy,and giving reasonable compensation,and to improve implementation systems including laws and regulations,communication,supervision,assessment and modification mechanism.