Local Government Officials Transfer To State-owned Enterprises And Inefficient Investment

After government officials transferred to state-owned enterprises,they will receive both economic incentives and political incentives.Under the special executive evaluation and promotion system unique to state-owned enterprises,transferred officials of different ages may make different investment behaviors.Based on the above analysis,this article constructs a theoretical framework of "the age of local government transferred officials and inefficient investment in stateowned enterprises",and specifically analyzes the consequences of this inference and the underlying mechanism through actual cases.The content of this article is mainly in three aspects:(1)Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis,the internal relationship between the age of stateowned enterprise executives and the investment efficiency of enterprises is deduced;(2)The analysis initially confirmed the relationship between the age of officials and the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises;(3)Constructing a multiple regression model,takes Angang Steel Co.,Ltd.and Shougang Co.,Ltd.as an example to illustrate the inferences obtained in the first two parts.This paper comprehensively uses research methods such as literature analysis,theoretical deduction,statistical analysis,and case analysis to draw the following preliminary conclusions:(1)State-owned enterprise executives receive more political incentives than economic incentives,and the older the executives,the less effective the incentives are.Significantly;(2)Cross-regional,high-level officials will curb over-investment,cross-industry officials will curb inefficient investment levels;(3)Local government officials transfer to state-owned enterprises,and young officials tend to overinvest and older officials tend to underinvest This reasoning is supported by a case study.The contributions of this paper are:(1)Enriched the current research on investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises;(2)This paper has initially verified the state-owned enterprises' high efficiency through descriptive statistical analysis.The relationship between heterogeneity and inefficient investment has enriched existing research;(3)The transfer of government officials to state-owned enterprises is one of the common methods for the selection of state-owned enterprise executives.The study provides a new perspective for the research on the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises.