Research On Supply Chain Decision-making Of Suppliers Participating In Manufacturers

Enterprises with related businesses have formed a strategic alliance of equity through mutual equity participation to improve revenue and competitiveness to cope with the increasingly complex market environment and market risks.This has gradually become the trend of corporate equity reform.Based on the premise that information is completely transparent and there are no other factors,this article takes the pricing and coordination of the supply chain of the supplier(Company A)as a shareholding manufacturer(Company B)as the research framework,and discusses the push type in turn.Supply chain decision-making under circumstances,pull situations,and push-pull hybrid situations.By building a theoretical model,conducting basic theoretical research,and further analyzing the feasibility of the model with a specific example.Finally,relevant suggestions for balanced decisionmaking and coordination strategies are put forward,which provide a basic framework for theoretical analysis for collaborative operation decision-making and supply chain system integration of each node enterprise in the supply chain.First,consider a supply chain model consisting of a single supplier A and a single manufacturer B in a linear market demand environment,and supplier A implements a shareholding strategy with manufacturer B.The Stackelberg game model is introduced to discuss the optimal order quantity and price decision of each node enterprise under the decentralized case and the centralized case.Research shows that supplier A's participation in manufacturer B can only weaken but not eliminate the double marginal effect in the supply chain system.Based on this,a supply chain coordination contract for revenue sharing and linear transfer payment is designed.The contract allows supplier A and manufacturer B to distribute system profits at any ratio by adjusting the wholesale price,so that the supply chain is perfectly coordinated.Second,consider a supply chain model that consists of a single supplier A and a single manufacturer B in a linear market demand scenario,and supplier A implements a shareholding strategy on manufacturer B.By introducing the Stackelberg game model,the optimal output and optimal price decision of each node enterprise under centralized and decentralized cases are discussed separately,and the system profits of centralized and decentralized supply chains are compared.Research shows that under the pull-type supply chain,after supplier A's participation in manufacturer B cannot eliminate the double marginal effect in the supply chain system,a supply chain coordination contract based on price subsidy and linear transfer payment is designed based on this.The contract takes the purchase price as an adjustment parameter,so that the supplier A and the manufacturer B distribute the system profits at an arbitrary ratio and coordinate the supply chain.Finally,considering a linear market demand situation,consider a supply chain model consisting of a single supplier A and a single manufacturer B with a two-stage push-pull hybrid supply chain,and supplier A implements a shareholding strategy on manufacturer B.By introducing the Stackelberg game model,the optimal output and optimal price decision of each node enterprise under centralized and decentralized cases are discussed separately,and the system profits of centralized and decentralized supply chains are compared.Research shows that in a push-pull mixed supply chain,after supplier A's participation in manufacturer B cannot eliminate the double marginal effect in the supply chain system,a two-phase combination coordination mechanism is designed based on this.The first half of the mechanism is based on the wholesale price,and by introducing a revenue sharing strategy and linear transfer payment(with a constraint ratio)between the push A and B companies,the second half of the mechanism is based on the purchase price.Introduce revenue-sharing strategies and linear transfer payment strategies between pull A and B companies to coordinate supply chains.Based on the background of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,this paper studies the case of mutual participation of a second-tier unit of Petro China and a foreign company to implement a share participation strategy for companies in related fields,improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain,reasonably distribute their respective benefits,integrate the supply chain,and save Social resources make recommendations.In addition,the research results of this article are of significance for advancing the deep reform of corporate governance structure,especially the introduction of foreign capital to achieve true mixed ownership.