Research On The Game Relations Of Multiple Interests In The Elderly Care Institutions

As an indispensable part of the pension service system,institutional pension services mainly rely on pension institutions to carry the institutional pension mode,so as to realize the main pension functions of institutional pension.This paper analyzes the subject behavior relationship of multiple providers of institutional pension by using welfare pluralism theory,collaborative governance theory and evolutionary game theory.The main types of pension institutions are divided into two types: public pension institutions that mainly rely on government subsidies and private pension institutions that want the government to promote compensation.Then it puts forward to build the evolutionary game relationship model of multiple suppliers of public pension institutions and the evolutionary game relationship model of multiple suppliers of private pension institutions.Using evolutionary game and MATLAB simulation numerical simulation to analyze the behavior strategies of multiple suppliers of these two pension institutions under the influence of different parameters will help to promote the coordination and cooperation between them and solve the dilemma of institutional pension to a certain extent.Through the research,it is found that,firstly,there are problems in the optimization of the institutional pension market.When the government invests in high or low subsidies,public pension institutions with low service quality are vulnerable to the temptation of high subsidies.They invest disguised costs to achieve the purpose of obtaining high subsidies,resulting in the phenomenon of "inferior products expelling superior products" and squeezing the government's subsidy investment.Therefore,the government needs to improve supervision,We will increase the punishment of public pension institutions that apply in violation of regulations.Secondly,after analyzing the tripartite game relationship among the suppliers of public elderly care institutions,the government,the elderly and non-profit organizations,it can be seen that in order to realize the effective supply of institutional elderly care,attract the collaborative cooperation of non-profit organizations and improve the quality of elderly care services,the cost of collaborative cooperation of non-profit organizations must be appropriate,and the government also needs to give policy support to the collaborative non-profit organizations.Finally,in the analysis of the behavior of multiple suppliers of private pension institutions,it is proposed that the government promotes compensation.For private pension institutions,it can not only alleviate the capital pressure and improve the infrastructure at the present stage,but also improve the quality of pension services.However,it is still possible that the compensation funds received will not be used for institutional development.Therefore,the government needs to strengthen supervision and punishment of pension institutions,Make the public believe that the government is constantly improving the supply status of institutional elderly care services,so as to ensure the credibility of the government.