Research On Cooperative Game Of Optimal Income Distribution Of Project Under Risk Appetite—Perspective Of Subcontracting

The cooperation between the general contractor and the subcontractor can create more project optimization benefits and increase the value of the project,and the scientific and reasonable income distribution plan in turn directly affects the quality and efficiency of the cooperation between the two parties.Existing studies are mostly based on non-cooperative game frameworks and do not take into account the differences in power status between the two parties,and they are slightly insufficient in the diversity of participants' risk preferences.Therefore,based on the current situation of unequal power status among general subcontractors,considering the risk preference combinations of “neutral-neutral”,“neutral-avoidance” and“avoid-avoidance” of the two parties,this paper constructs the corresponding asymmetric Nash Negotiation game model,different optimal income distribution schemes were obtained.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)The income distribution coefficient is negatively related to the general contractor's negotiation ability,negatively related to the general contractor's risk avoidance coefficient,and positively related to the subcontractor's risk avoidance coefficient.(2)The bargaining power of both parties to the cooperation not only affects the distribution of total output between the two parties,but also affects the total output of the cooperation.(3)The level of effort of the subcontractor increases as it increases,and the profit of the subcontractor also increases.(4)When the degree of risk aversion of the subcontractor is low,it will promote the opportunistic behavior of the general contractor,so that the subcontractor's willingness to work will be further suppressed,and when the risk aversion of the subcontractor is lower than the risk aversion of the general contractor,The subcontractor's share of revenue will be higher than that of the general contractor.(5)When the risk aversion of the general contractor is less than the risk aversion of the subcontractor,the effort level of the general contractor decreases as the negotiation ability increases;when the risk aversion of the general contractor is greater than the risk aversion of the subcontractor At the same time,the general contractor's level of effort increases first and then decreases as the negotiation ability increases;the subcontractor's level of effort decreases as the general contractor's negotiation capacity increases.This research not only provides a new research method for optimizing the distribution of benefits between subcontracting projects,but also introduces the irrational factor of risk appetite,which further improves the explanatory power of the model.In practice,it can provide useful guidance and reference for the general contractor to reasonably formulate subcontracting contracts to optimize the revenue terms,with a view to better motivate subcontractors to actively participate in cooperation.