An Analysis Of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

The traditional reflection theory of self-consciousness leads to two difficulties: infinite regress and circular interpretation.Faced with these two difficulties,Kant adopted an 'avoidance strategy',He avoided theoretical inquiry into transcendental self-consciousness and instead took it as a precondition in his cognitive activities,but the 'avoidance strategy' exposed Kant to the question of dogmatism,so Fichte advocates replacing the reflective theory of self-consciousness with a productive model of self-consciousness,and ultimately he finds that reflective self-consciousness is grounded in a non-objectified,immediate,pre-reflective self-consciousness,but Fichte's lack of a rigorous philosophical approach makes his description of the concept of 'pre-reflective self-consciousness' obscure and lacking in evident.This paper first describes "pre-reflective self-consciousness" by means of "phenomenological reduction",rejecting the theoretical explanation of self-consciousness from a third-person perspective and adopting a first-person perspective to describe the content of self-consciousness,clarify the relationship between self-consciousness and consciousness,and analyse the temporal structure of self-consciousness,the results of which show that self-consciousness is inseparable from the experience of consciousness."Pre-reflective self-consciousness" is essentially the first-person mineness of consciousness experience,and self-awareness of consciousness experience.Zahavi and others also refer to the 'pre-reflective self-consciousness' as the'minimal self',which they support in opposition to the radical 'narrative self'.Secondly,the description of kinesthetic experience,combined with the theory of embodied cognition,demonstrates the role of the body in constructing a'pre-reflective sense of self' as the basis for a sense of self,which consists of two kinds of bodily sensations: the sense of agency and the sense of ownership.They are both first-order pre-reflective bodily experiences,the former dependent on motor intention and the latter important for self-identification and the construction of self-identity.Finally,the paper draws on empirical research in cognitive science on the rubber hand illusion to provide a thematic account of the sense of ownership,showing that the pre-reflective sense of ownership is strongly correlated with the production of the illusion,and that this strong correlation will be elucidated in a phenomenological account of the longitudinal intentionality of retention of sense of ownership.This paper argues that the phenomenological approach is valuable for the deepening of the theory of "pre-reflective self-consciousness" and can contribute to the interactive construction of cognitive science and phenomenology.