Game Model Of Cooperation Mechanism For Joint Treatment Of Cross-border River Pollution

Ecological civilization is developing day by day,and international rivers,one of the important components of global freshwater,are vital to human survival and development.At present,the water quality of international rivers is not good.The scale and severity of pollution in international river basins have reached unprecedented levels.There is an urgent need to increase the protection and pollution reduction of international rivers and make the water quality of international rivers better.However,international rivers are transnational,external and non-compliant.These factors lead to inefficient pollution control in the basin.More than two countries are in the same basin,which means that the management of international rivers involves many factors,and its externality means that the main body of a single basin lacks subjective motivation for basin protection.Non-exclusiveness forces the upstream and downstream of the basin bears the responsibility of protecting the watershed together,which has caused the "tragedy of the commons" in the water basins.The mutual constraints and influences among the countries of the international rivers are extremely significant.Close cooperation between countries is the prerequisite for maximizing the benefits of water pollution control.However,at present,there is no unified international management system that can establish strict rules for cooperation between river basin countries.Therefore,how to achieve a stable cooperation mechanism for the joint pollution control of cross-border river basins is the primary problem we are currently facing.There are two aspects to solve this problem.One aspect is that how to achieve cooperation among the countries in the river basin to avoid the "prisoner's dilemma";the other aspect is that how to reasonably share the costs of upstream and downstream pollution control to achieve stable cooperation.This article considers the mechanism for the upstream and downstream countries to reach a cooperative equilibrium,explores the cooperative equilibrium based on reciprocal utility,and discusses the issue of the allocation of pollution control costs.This article mainly consists of the following two parts:First,this article discusses the sequential reciprocal game equilibrium of upstream and downstream countries in the basin.Based on the analysis of the reciprocal psychological utility of upstream and downstream countries,a sequential reciprocal game model of cooperative pollution control in the upstream and downstream of international rivers is established.By explaining the equilibrium results under the material benefits and the game equilibrium results based on reciprocal utility,the trade-off process between obtaining material benefits and establishing long-term reciprocal cooperation in the basin are analyzed,and it is concluded that when the material conditions are not met,the upstream and downstream countries can still achieve cooperation based on reciprocal utility.The main factors affecting the effective establishment of reciprocal cooperation and the mechanism of the cooperative equilibrium between countries in the basin are discussed.Second,this article makes a study on the cost allocation of the joint pollution control of cross border rivers.This article establishes a feature function of pollution control cost based on each country's own pollution emissions and the impact of pollution emissions from upstream countries,and establishes cost-sharing models of the joint pollution control of cross border rivers based on the minimum core method,the SCRB method,the Shapley value method and the Owen value method.This article also tests the results of the models,and analysises the models from three perspectives,which are fairness,stability,and satisfaction.Taking the Lancang-Mekong River basin as an example,the cost apportionment is carried out,which proves the necessity of cooperation,and the relative merits of apportionment methods is compared and evaluated,which is concluded that the Owen value method has advantages in dealing with the problem of cost allocation of watershed pollution control.The main innovations of this article are as follows:(1)Considering the differences in decision-making sequence and reciprocal psychology of upstream and downstream countries,this article applies sequential reciprocity games to the study of joint pollution control of international rivers,and discusses the trade-offs between material benefits and the establishment of long-term river basin reciprocal relations between upstream and downstream countries,which provides theoretical basis and development direction to international river basin cooperation.(2)Based on the cooperative game theory,this article constructs feature function of pollution control cost in the basin and use a variety of cost-sharing models to share the cost of joint pollution control in various countries.Especially considering the differences in the teratment of pollution control between upstream and downstream countries in the basin,the Owen value method is used to solve this problem.By evaluating the models through three perspectives,which are fairness,stability,and satisfaction,the superiority of this method in dealing with international joint pollution control has been proved.