The management of labour: A theory of inequality, control and conflict

This thesis develops a critical theory of structural variation in labour management relations at the level of the firm, focusing upon the implications of organizational size, operations technology, market conditions, and employer economic structure for managerial practices, the terms of employment, workplace authority structures, and, ultimately, various forms of industrial conflict. Though intended primarily as a contribution to the field of industrial relations, it eschews the "orthodox" pluralism associated with the mainstream of the field in favour of the critical sociological tradition, grounded in the work of Marx and Weber and currently embodied in the "structural inequality", the "labour process", and the "radical social action" literature associated with the "new industrial sociology" emergent over the past decade and a half. The theory is developed in three stages. First, a "radical political economic" perspective is advanced, arguing that work organizations are legally authoritarian systems managed in the interests of profit and that control is a central "problem", with management investing in various "means to control" to that point at which "political economy" is achieved, or the combined costs of the means to control and conflict are minimized. Then, a framework for analyzing variation in conflict and control is proposed and drawn upon to develop propositions about the implications of variation in three general means to control: progressive management practices, favourable terms of employment, and authoritative constraints in the workplace. Finally, explanations for structural variation in these means to control are developed, and propositions established. Three "key" explanations are advanced: worker exit, strike, and job power; "cost economies" in managerial expenditures on control; and worker "prior consciousness". The propositions developed in the theory are then drawn upon to inform the analysis of a comprehensive set of survey data collected from 112 unionized Canadian firms in 1980-81, with mixed results. Finally, the implications of the analysis are discussed, focusing upon the failings of contemporary institutional arrangements and the viability of worker ownership and control as an alternative.