Military coalition building: A structural and normative assessment of coalition architecture

This thesis analyzes structural and normative factors that affect the achievement of results in military coalitions. Hypotheses are generated from coalition literature concerning the correlation between factors that impact the formation of the military organization and the stability, processes, and effectiveness of coalition activity. These factors include: coalition size, capabilities, ideology, scale of integration, and leadership. This research project tests propositions in two military coalition examples, formed under similar sets of geopolitical circumstances, comprised of comparable numbers of state actors that achieved significantly different results.;In conclusion, future research on coalitions should focus on organizational conditions for synchronous operations. Further study of this relatively new element of the American national security strategy will contribute to a closer and more direct linkage between coalition theory and practice in international relations literature.;The findings identify conditions for a dilemma paradigm for those who build coalitions in the security setting. The Commander's Dilemma involves situations in which political actors with widely varying military capabilities join the coalition organization. Although some members are operationally unsuited or incompatible with other partners for combat operations, commanders, nevertheless are required to make choices that position allies in the military organization. These choices contribute to the stability and/or synchronization of forces. The dilemma for coalition leaders is in the choice of architectural blueprint that provides for an outcome with the most satisfaction. The preferred military outcome extends beyond the immediacy of political stability to include the long-term, efficient and effective pursuit of the maximum military payoff possible, gained through the synchronization of resources. The consequence of these choices ranges from political penalties generally associated with instability to military penalties that occur with an operationally ineffective force. The findings suggest that principles of coalition theory are applicable to security situations, but are sometimes ignored in the construction of real world coalitions. Structural and normative accommodations made to improve the stability of the political alignment are sometimes done at risk to the military efficacy of the combat operation.