Risk-taking in countering terrorism: A study of United States presidential decisions to use special operations and covert action

This thesis examines U.S. presidential decisions to take risks in countering terrorism. A particular counter-terrorist (CT) option is determined to be risky, or more risky than another, if it has the greatest variance in outcome: if it produces the worst outcome if it fails and the best outcome if it succeeds. Accordingly, risky CT operations are those that may produce the worst political and operational consequences when they fail, yet can generate the most effective results in reducing terrorism and saving lives when they succeed. An examination of four CT instruments---law enforcement action, conventional military strikes, special operations and covert action---reveals the latter two are the riskier approaches. A decision to take risks in countering terrorism is, therefore, a decision to use special operations and covert action.; To determine when presidents decide to take risks in combating terrorism, this thesis applies a situational analysis of risk-taking: prospect theory. As opposed to theories that associate risk propensity with an individual's personality, prospect theory establishes that the situation--- the context of decision---better explains aversion to and acceptance of risk. Simply put, the theory predicts that individuals are cautious when they are in a good position, or domain of gains, and risk-acceptant when operating from a losing position, or domain of losses. In other words, prospect theory predicts that presidents will take risks in countering terrorism, authorizing special operations or covert action, when they perceive themselves to be operating from a position of losses.; Three presidential decisions to initiate risk-seeking CT operations are examined: Jimmy Carter's 1980 decision to rescue U.S. citizens held captive in Iran; Ronald Reagan's 1984 decision to use CIA-backed surrogates to attack terrorists preemptively in Lebanon; and Reagan's 1985 decision to approve the sale of weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. As prospect theory predicts, this thesis finds that both presidents were operating from positions of losses when they authorized their respective CT operations. The thesis concludes by exploring the consequences of this finding for U.S. CT strategy, policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.