| In this dissertation, I draw on recent attempts by philosophers of mind, psychologists, neurologists, and computer scientists to better understand the mind. I argue that the findings from this interdisciplinary discussion of the mind should inform discussions in ethics. More specifically, I argue that evidence for the pervasiveness of perception-like mental processes in determining moral saliencies of particular situations should be used as a basis for reshaping ethical theory.;As I use the term, moral perceiving encompasses (1) determining if a particular situation does or does not call for a moral response, and (2) determining the moral saliencies of those situations which do call for a moral response. I describe moral perception as a determination arrived at using sensory data and our theories--either our high-level articulable theories or our low-level embodied theories or a complex combination of both.;A main thesis is that much of our day-to-day moral mental life incorporates perception-like mental processes. I argue that the perceiving of moral saliencies in particular situations incorporates the deployment of holistic context-dependent mental structures and that gestalt-like shifts in our moral perceptions occur when we deploy distinctly different holistic structures. I maintain that whenever we experience gestalt shifts, we can also be viewed as shifting from the deployment of one embodied theory to the deployment of a different embodied theory. I further stress that in certain highly time-constrained moral perceptions we exclusively deploy embodied theories--theories that are not directly penetrable by articulable moral rules or principles. |
