Politics of trade and environment and the transboundary trade of genetically modified organisms: A study of institutional process, regime overlap and North-South politics in global rule-making

In this study I examine process and deliberation in global trade and environment fora which deal with overlapping trade-environment issues. I suggest that differences between fora in these previously independent areas of international co-operation can be meaningfully categorized in terms of the degree to which they promote communicative, as compared to strategic action. I find that in rule-making on the trans-boundary trade in genetically modified organisms, the existence of a forum with more inclusive and egalitarian process and greater information symmetry, worked in favor of the diffusion of green norms and rules. This pattern largely contradicts the rich-green model of trade-environment politics which posits developed countries to be the primary advocates and beneficiaries of green rule-making, and which subsequently implies that fora in which these states are most powerful are likely to be the most environment-friendly.; I examine the generalizability of patterns in this case to a broader realm of international trade-environment issues by interviewing officers of relevant global environmental non-governmental organizations as to their views of what constitute the major trade-environment issues, the relative importance of these issues, and their organizations' degree of agreement with the US, G77, and EU positions on each issue. I find that with the exception of the case of overlapping issues in the WTO, the respondents tend to see their organizations as having the greatest degree of agreement with the G77. This suggests that the rule-making on trade in genetically modified organisms is not anomalous in its divergence from the rich-green model.; I conclude that institutions can either intensify or mitigate the extent to which asymmetry and egoism prevail as factors in international rule-making, and that the explanatory efficacy of the rich-green hypothesis must be considered limited and conditional, most applicable in cases where power asymmetries and egoistic behavior are built into institutional process and deliberation. Its expectation that broader inclusivity, and greater empowerment of developed states will inhibit environment-friendly rule-making seems unwarranted. Greater inclusion, and more public and egalitarian process, may in fact advance the cause of environment-friendly rule-making on trade-environment issues.