Wanting the bad and doing the bad things: An essay in moral psychology

In this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to desire what is believed to be bad and not at all good, to intentionally pursue what is believed to be bad and not at all good, and that the believed badness of an action can be an agent's reason for acting. I refer to these theses as the desirebad, intentionbad, and reasonbad theses, respectively.; I consider various accounts of desire and I argue that all but one is consistent with the desirebad thesis. The account that is inconsistent, what I call the Thomist account, implies that believing that the object of desire is good is necessary for desiring it. However, the Thomist account depends on dubious assumptions about the nature of desire and what it is to act intelligibly. I also consider various accounts of intention and I argue that the intentionbad thesis is consistent with all of them, including accounts that identify intentions with a kind of evaluation and the outcome of a kind of decision.; I then consider objections to my three theses. For example, it is plausible to suppose that intentional action is performed for reasons, but it seems that the intentional pursuit of the bad cannot be action performed for reasons. This objection fails because it fails to distinguish different kinds of reasons; in particular, it fails to distinguish normative reasons and an agent's reason for acting. Here is another objection. Some philosophers claim that agents who intentionally pursue the bad cannot be in control of or understand themselves and what they do. I consider various ways that agents can possess control and understanding; for example, by having goals and performing goal-directed behavior, by deliberately forming and executing intentions, and by treating considerations as reasons. I argue that at least some agents who intentionally pursue the bad possess control and understanding, just as agents who act intentionally do.; In responding to these objections, I develop a positive account of intentional action and agency that is inclusive enough to explain non-standard agents and their actions.