An Examination of Thomas Hurka's Virtue Consequentialism

In this dissertation, I examine three separate issues pertaining to Thomas Hurka's virtue consequentialism. Hurka's account describes virtue as a positive orientation towards a good, and a vice as a negative orientation towards a good. The three goods that Hurka assigns to his theory are: pleasure, achievement, and knowledge. In my first paper I argue that an indirect approach to virtue development is more effective than a direct approach. I propose that an individual will have an easier time becoming virtuous if he works on cultivating his empathy, and being guided by a rational commitment to promoting the goods, rather than depending strictly on his willpower, and a rational commitment to promoting the goods. In the second paper I criticize Hurka's definition of humility, and argue for my own account. Hurka characterizes humility as an asymmetrical recognition of goods. We might inflate the goods of others even though they are equal to our own, or we might deflate our own compared to the equal goods of others. I argue that this conflicts with his theory of virtue, and does not capture what is valuable about humility. I provide my own account of humility as a skill utilized by mentors. The third paper argues that Hurka's account of virtue does not accurately describe intrinsic value, and therefore would be rejected by virtue ethicists. His account is committed to describing the intrinsic value of virtue as part of a conditional organic unity. I argue that this is different from the intrinsic value argued for by traditional virtue ethicists.