| My thesis takes another look at the discussion of poetry in Plato's early dialogues (which I take to express the views of the historical Socrates). I argue that Socrates does not believe poets are divinely inspired; rather, his treatment of poetry must be approached from the point of view of two key Socratic concerns: the nature of desire (as expressed in the Protagoras and Gorgias), and the distinction between techne (craft or science) and empeiria (knack) in the Gorgias. For, both the theory of desire and the dismissal of certain practices from the realm of techne proper (e.g., oratory, cookery, poetry), point to a radical stance on the nature of psychological states---one that does not bode well for the value of poetry.; All desire that leads to---and so explains---action is for our own real good (our happiness) and not for the apparent good. So when we act in error about our good, we do not desire to do what we do (hence 'no one errs willingly'). Thus, we don't know what we specifically desire until we know what is truly good for us. There are no irrational desires, and no other incommensurable rational desires that can lead us to perform any specific action. So, to live well, we need knowledge of our good; and this is all there is to virtue.; Furthermore, Socrates treats all of our mental states like desire: we cannot have knowledge of pleasures, beliefs, or intentions without knowledge of the reality towards which those mental states are directed. The problem, then, with "knacks" (e.g., oratory, cookery, poetry) is that they do not require knowledge of the truth about their subject matter: the beliefs, pleasures, and intentions of the people they seek to persuade or gratify. Thus, e.g., Ion's struggles in the Ion, and Socrates' interpretation of Simonides in the Protagoras all point in the same direction: the study of poetry has no value if it is not at the same time a study of the truth. Yet, only Socratic dialogue, or dialectic, can hope to make real progress towards the knowledge we desire. |
