| This Thesis examines whether competition law and policy played a significant role in the economic development of Korea between the early rapid growth period and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Whether the market or government should be the primary institution for development has been debated by neoclassical, revisionist, and Post-Washington Consensus scholars, with each implying a different answer regarding the significance of competition law and policy in economic development. With these theories as a backdrop, this Thesis examines Korea in depth, first by analyzing the impact of industrial policy on domestic market competition, and second by exploring the development of competition law.;This Thesis reaches two conclusions. First, Korea's development goal during the early stage---the high growth period (1962-1979)---was exclusively focused on high economic growth. This growth was accomplished successfully without significant involvement of competition law and policy. Second, during the later stage of development---the transitional period (1980-1997)---Korea's development goal was transforming its economic system from a government-driven system to a market-oriented system. However, the transition towards market mechanisms was incomplete in the industrial and financial sectors, and competition law and policy did not fulfill its expected role in establishing market mechanisms in the resource allocation process within each product market. As a normative suggestion for the transitional period, this Thesis argues that enforcement of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRA), Korea's first competition law, should have primarily focused on protecting competition rather than other secondary goals.;A consequence of the implementation of Korea's industrial policy, which was biased towards large businesses, was the concentration of economic power in chaebols (large business groups in Korea). The MRA attempted to address the resulting inefficiency and equity problems through (1) generally applicable rules and (2) chaebol-specific rules. However, the generally applicable rules were not thorough enough to discipline chaebols, and the chaebol-specific rules' impact on efficiency was uncertain and the rules improved equity only partially. This Thesis suggests that stronger competitive pressure through generally applicable rules and a conjunctive approach to chaebol-specific rules, which incorporated financial regulation and corporate governance reforms, would have been more effective in obtaining the intended results. |
