Recognition and reconciliation: The new role of theory in aesthetics

George Dickie's institutional theory of art has been subject to extensive debate over the past 30 years. It has been both revered and deplored, garnering such attention for the seemingly controversial way in which Dickie answers the question, "What is art?" In Dickie's view, an object derives its existence as a work of art in the context of the informal institution of the "artworld," a concept which was borrowed from Arthur Danto's earlier work on the theoretical context surrounding works of art. Whether one finds the idea appealing or appalling, it is one that quite simply cannot be ignored, since the empirical validity of the institutional structure of art and the sorts of problems it can cause, especially in our particular time, are so remarkably clear.;In 1956, Morris Weitz argued that the proper role of theory in aesthetics is not to provide a definition, since the concept of art is one in which no essence can be discerned. Instead, the role of theory is to single out features of works of art that are worthy of attention and that may have been missed by previous theories. Recently, Peter Kivy has also suggested that a meaningful definition of art cannot be provided, given the very diverse and irreconcilable activities that are all thought to be works of art, and that what philosophers of art should do instead is develop philosophies of art. Although I do not wish to conclude that the task of defining "art" is no longer a viable option for philosophers, I will provide an alternative way of philosophizing about art that is similar to the methods Weitz and Kivy have proposed. I will illuminate a new way of interpreting the theories of Collingwood, Tolstoy, and Danto which is different from those that have been proposed in the past, one that highlights their normative and institutional features. On the foundations of this new interpretation, I will propose a new role for the philosopher of art, one that takes into consideration the significance of the institutional structure of the artworld and how it can be normatively constrained.;Another significant feature of Dickie's institutional theory is that it provides a definition of art, a problem that philosophers of art have attempted to solve for the past few centuries. Dickie's theory inclines one to dismiss other candidates for definitions as implausible, such as those put forth by R.G. Collingwood and Leo Tolstoy, since, as Dickie insists, an acceptable definition of art must be able to account for the many different kinds of practices that are all referred to as "art." Both Collingwood and Tolstoy advance restricted conceptions of art that are meant to confine the use of the term "art" to a specific kind of creative activity. These conceptions do not provide plausible definitions, since we have entered an era of pluralism in the arts, and thus the definition must accurately reflect the practice.