Operational Risk And Institutional Optimization Of Internal Capital Market Of Financial Holding Enterprise Group

In the process of enterprise group operation and management,there is not only internal product market,but also internal capital market formed by the circulation and allocation of funds among the member enterprises in the internal market.In recent years,some enterprise groups have gradually penetrated into the financial industry and actually controlled various types of financial enterprises such as commercial Banks,securities companies and trust companies,which seem to have the characteristics of a financial holding enterprise group.At the present stage,because China's regulatory system is not yet perfect and the corporate governance of financial enterprises is not yet standardized,some financial holding groups,in order to seek their own development,covertly transfer their interests through related party transactions and other operation modes of internal capital market to damage the rights and interests of financial enterprises.On May 24,2019,Baoshang Bank was taken over due to serious credit risks,becoming the first commercial bank to be taken over in nearly 20 years.The root cause of the serious credit risk of Baoshang Bank lies in the long-term occupation of its large amount of capital by its controlling shareholder Tomorrow Group,forming the overdue.Based on the case study of Baoshang Bank,this paper studies the mechanism,path and consequences of the financial holding enterprise group 's illegal appropriation of a large amount of funds of its financial enterprises,and proposes targeted optimization schemes.After the takeover of Baoshang Bank,the equity structure of the newly established Mengshang Bank is more clear and transparent,and the background of the management team is more clear,which helps the bank operate more prudently in the future.The follow-up operation effect of Mengshang bank needs to be further tracked and judged.The research of this paper brings new enlightenment to the existing relevant research and regulatory agencies.Different from the previous cases,the equity structure and related transactions disclosed by the Baoshang Bank can not be directly related to Tomorrow Group.This study finds that Tomorrow Group actually controls the Baoshang Bank through its "shadow company",and through its "shadow company" and its related parties and the Baoshang Bank to have hidden related transactions and other behaviors,to achieve the transfer of interests,so that its illegal behavior is difficult to be recognized by regulators.The case study of this paper is helpful to better understand the operational risk of internal capital market of financial holding enterprise group,and also provides a reference for regulators to realize the penetration supervision of the financial holding group,so as to promote the more sustainable and healthy development of the financial holding enterprise group.