Research On Matching Between Retailers And Manufacturers With Consignment Policy

Consignment is common in both traditional sales and online markets.under the consignment,the manufacturer generally pays a slotting fee to the retailer,besides the retailer also gain a withholding percentage of the sales revenue from the sales proceeds according to the proportion agreement in the consignment contract.From the retailer's point of view,the higher eonsignment policy will affect the number of eooperative manufacturers.The lower consignment policy will affect the retailers' revenue from a single manufacturer.From the manufacturer's point of view,it should not only compare the consignment profit with the self-operated profit,but also compare the profit differences with different retailers to make a choice.Therefore,there is a match game between the retailers and the manufacturers.We explore the matching mechanism between retailers and manufacturers by establishing a consignment policy model that maximizes the retailer's revenue based on the above background.We study the consignment policy optimization problem under the condition where the retailer monopoly and the consignment policy game when two retailers are competing.In the the retailer monopoly situation,we establish a mixed integer programming model based on zero profit lines,and propose the calculation manner of corner point method by graphical method.Our study shows the manufacturer's self-operating capacity scale gap will affect the retailer's optimal consignment policy.In addition,although the size of the manufacturers is different,the retailer's slotting fee,revenue and promotion ability are linearly positively correlated.The withholding percentage of the sales revenue is also positively correlated in the consignment policy,but the growth rate gradually decreases and tends to be stable,while the matching between retailers and manufacturers result remains unchanged.We establish a four parts matching game when two retailers are competing for two manufacturers based on the stackelberg game theory,and give a consignment policy equilibrium.We found that the equilibrium depends on the difference between the two retailers and the consignment policy in the competition market is slightly milder than that in the monopoly market,and the corresponding consignment gains of manufacturers have increased.We establish a bi-level programming with equilibrium constraints model and the algorithm of consignment policy decision and the matching problem under multiple manufacturer conditions is given on this basis.We also propose an inverse recursive algorithm based on matching results.The research results have important guidance and reference for the practice of consignment supply chain.