Research On The Correlation Between Executive Compensation Incentives And Operating Performance Of China’s Listed Commercial Banks

At present,the transformation and upgrading of economic structure is imminent,and China’s banking industry has ushered in the era of "carrying forward".As a pillar of the financial industry and even the whole national economy,the stability of commercial banks is related to financial development and social stability.However,under such huge downward pressure on the economy,there is still a phenomenon that the executives of commercial banks can still receive the "high price salary",which has caused strong public dissatisfaction.In order to solve the business crisis of commercial banks and improve the executive compensation incentive mechanism,countries have successively promulgated salary limit policies and continuously strengthened supervision.With the continuous advancement of China’s financial reform process,the research on the relationship between executive compensation incentives and operating performance of China’s listed commercial banks has also become more important,with a view to effectively preventing the moral hazard and adverse selection of bank executives,and replaying executive compensation the checks and balances of the incentive mechanism seek institutional guarantee for the improvement of the operating performance of commercial banks.This article first introduces the research background at home and abroad,intended to elicit the purpose and significance of the research in this article,and then use the literature research method to review the literature,review the previous research results,summarize the experience and deficiencies,and provide ideas for the research of this article.Secondly,this article sorts out the concepts and theories involved in the research,and prepares the theory for subsequent empirical research.Then we select the financial data of 16 commercial banks listed in A-share market in 2008-2018 as the research sample,and use the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to explain the current situation of their executive compensation incentive mechanism from the aspects of salary structure,salary limit policy,data analysis,etc.In addition,the research follows the principles of profitability,liquidity,security and growth of commercial banks,selects the corresponding indicators to evaluate the current situation of bank operation performance,and proves the necessity for the subsequent use of factor analysis to build a comprehensive performance indicator system.Through calculation,the expression of comprehensive performance F is obtained.At the same time,based on the research hypothesis of this paper,relevant control variables and dummy variables are introduced,together with executive compensation indicators to build panel data,and cross product terms are introduced to construct a regression model for analysis.Finally,based on the previous research Conduct two-way exploration and excavation.The results of the study show that the compensation incentives for executives of listedcommercial banks in China are related to the operating performance curve.At the same time,the implementation of the salary limit policy,the expansion of the bank size,the concentration of equity and the improvement of the independent director system will all affect the relationship between the two.After conducting a series of analyses using Stata15.0software,we obtained the research conclusions of this article,and combined with the status quo analysis and existing problems,gave relevant suggestions: First,find the best point of bank’s operating performance,implement a reasonable range of executive compensation incentives,including the introduction of medium and long-term equity incentives,strengthening the relevance of executive compensation and operating performance,and building a comprehensive performance evaluation system.The second is to continuously improve the connotation of the executive compensation incentive mechanism.Relevant regulatory authorities should flexibly limit wages to avoid a "one size fits all" blow to bank executives’ enthusiasm.The third is to build a diversified executive compensation incentive mechanism,optimize bank governance structure,enhance bank internal supervision and execution,and realize the long-term development of commercial banks.