| Nowadays, there is a growing trend of economic globalization. A growing number of foreign banks begin to set up its branches in China and expand its business contact with its China clients, due to which China domestic commercial banks, state-owned banks or joint-equity banks, are confronted with increasing fierce competition from its foreign counterparts. The transitional stage economy has caused substantial negative influence to China domestic commercial banks:the low economic efficiency and low international competitiveness. Against this background, it is of great practical significance to analyze and study on how to maximize domestic banks' senior executives'work passion and enthusiasm as well as establish a scientific and efficient salary incentive system.This paper analyses the reality and malpractices of China domestic banks'senior executives'salary incentive system from the perspective of modern enterprise incentive theories and corporate governance. Taking 13 domestic listed commercial banks as sample, the paper tries to construct a state-owned commercial banks'executive incentives econometric model to analyze the mutual relationship between senior executives'salary and commercial banks'business performance, asset size as well as equity structure by using correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis methods.The paper suggests to set up a performance-based incentive mechanism for the commercial banks as well as independent board of directors. It is also very urgent to further corporate governance work of commercial banks and build a effective check and balance among board of directors, board of supervisors as well as senior executives. Establishing stock options and other forms of long term salary incentive measures also plays a pretty important role. |