The Influence Research Of Executive Compensation External Fairness On Company’s Innovation Investment

China’s economy has been facing a transitional stage,and innovative economic development occupies a pivotal position in the economic development strategy.As a component of the market economy,listed companies undoubtedly shoulder the important task of innovative economic development.For the development of listed companies themselves,innovation is also very important,innovation can increase their own survivability and competitiveness.At the same time,in recent years,frequent exposures of high-priced executive compensation incidents have aroused people’s high attention to the fairness of social distribution.For this reason,the state has successively introduced compensation limit policies to control the compensation of state-owned enterprise executives,and the issue of the fairness of executive compensation has come to people’s vision.Existing research has proved that executive compensation fairness will have an impact on the behavior of executives,which in turn will have an impact on company performance,but research on the impact of executive compensation fairness on company innovation investment is still rare.This paper analyzes the relationship between the external fairness of executive compensation and the company’s innovation investment from the perspective of psychological contract theory,explores the moderating effect of the stickiness of executive compensation and the proportion of executive shareholding in the above relationship,and test the different performance of the above relationship in state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies.Taking the 2010-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research object,the following conclusions are drawn after empirical testing:(1)External advantages unfair of executive compensation promotes the company’s innovation investment,and external disadvantages unfair of executive compensation inhibits the company’s innovation investment;(2)Increasing executive compensation stickiness has no moderating effect on the promotion effect between the external advantages unfair of executive compensation and the company’s innovation investment,but it helps to alleviate the inhibitory effect of external disadvantages unfair of executive compensation on company’s innovation investment,which proves that executive compensation stickiness is an alternative compensation mechanism for insufficient executive compensation incentives,not a complete agency problem;(3)The increase in the proportion of executive shareholding will not only enhance the external advantages unfair of executive compensation on company’s innovation investment,but also increase the inhibitory effect of the external disadvantages unfair of executive compensation on the company’s innovation investment.After further research,it is found that the impact of executive compensation external fairness on the company’s innovation investment is more significant in non-state-owned companies;The mitigation effect of executive compensation stickiness on the external disadvantages unfair of executive compensation is only established in state-owned companies;The moderating effect of the proportion of executive shareholding is only established in non-state-owned companies.The research conclusions of this paper can provide theoretical support and management suggestions for the company’s innovation investment management and executive incentive mechanism design.