| With the development of the economy,earnings management has become a hot issue in the research of corporate finance.A large number of domestic and foreign researches have found that the management of the company will manage the earnings of accruals through accounting policy choices for private interests,and it will also be short-term.Benefits and real-life management through real transactions that may affect the long-term development of the company.There have been many studies on accrued earnings management,but there are not many studies on real earnings management,and the conclusions are often not uniform.Therefore,it is meaningful to study the incentives of real earnings management and related governance approaches.Based on this,this paper takes the 2009-2017 China CSI A-share non-financial insurance industry non-ST listed companies as observation samples,specifically to investigate the influencing factors of real earnings management.Specifically,it examines the role of executive compensation and institutional investors in corporate governance,mainly to study whether executive compensation is a company’s earnings management behavior,especially for real earnings management,in the process of corporate governance.And whether institutional investors play an active supervisor role in corporate governance,and play a role in constraining management to conduct real earnings management.This paper uses STATA statistical software to analyze the differences between executive monetary compensation and equity incentives on real earnings management by using multiple regression analysis methods,and considers the role of institutional investors in corporate governance.The conclusions are as follows:(1)The higher the executive monetary compensation,the more serious the company’s real earnings management;(2)the higher the executive compensation,the lower the real earnings management of the enterprise;(3)the proportion of institutional investors Promote real earnings management behavior;institutional investors’ shareholding ratio reversely regulates the negative correlation between executive shareholding ratio and real earnings management,while the relationship between executive monetary compensation and real earnings management is not significant. |
