Research On The Influence Of Executive Compensation Structure On Real Earnings Management Of Listed Companies

Financial reporting is a key way for listed companies to disclose information externally.Earnings management behavior will directly damage the quality of information disclosure,and bring great obstacles to stakeholders' decision making.This will not only damage the legitimate rights and interests of the external stakeholders,but also to a large extent,bring the additional cost burden to the enterprise itself,and ultimately the operation efficiency of the capital market has a bad effect.The study of earnings management motivation is an effective way to curb this behavior,and has established a solid foundation for the establishment of earnings management and supervision system.In recent years,the topic of earnings management has attracted much attention.The existing research tends to think that the principle-oriented and rule-oriented accounting standards are relatively more likely to produce a series of inducible effects,resulting in the conversion of earnings management to a more concealed real earnings management.The shareholders of a company usually determine the level of the executive's salary according to the performance results of the enterprise,and the judgment of the performance of the company depends mainly on the results of the financial report.Therefore,the improvement of the salary level is also a major motive for the executives to implement the earnings management behavior.And the exposure of millions,tens of millions of annual salaries of listed companies has gradually pushed the issue of fairness of salary distribution to the cusp of the storm.Based on the theory of fairness,the members of the organization will compare the fairness of the final distribution results after obtaining their own rewards.The results of the comparison will have a direct effect on their future work attitude and work enthusiasm.This comparison includes not only the inside of the organization,but also the comparison with the outside industry.Therefore,from the two angles of executive compensation structure,that is,executive compensation level and executive compensation gap,this paper probes into the related influence on real earnings management,and takes into account the special national conditions of our country,and further explores whether the nature of different property rights will make use of the results.In this paper,I choose the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016 as the research samples and select related variables.First,I make descriptive statistics on the variables,then do Pearson and Spearson tests,and finally I do multiple regression analysis and robustness tests.This paper found that: First,the compensation contract of listed companies does constitute a motivation of earnings management,level of executive monetary compensation and equity incentive behavior,managerial ownership of real earnings management has a significant role in promoting,and the nature of property rights will weaken the level of executive monetary compensation to the real earnings management role,and to equity incentive did not have a significant role in the relationship between behavior and managerial ownership and real earnings management.Second,the internal compensation gap will affect the real earnings management behavior,and it has a "inverted U" relationship with the real earnings management.Third,the pay gap between executives and external real earnings management is positively relationship,namely external salary gap will induce executives real earnings management behavior,and the nature of property rights will dampen the positive relationship between the pay gap outside executives and real earnings management.