| Institutional investors emerge from the western capital markets and are now playing a decisive role in the securities market.Aware of the important role of institutional investors,China has promulgated a series of laws and policies in recent 10 years to promote the growth of institutional investors,and the scale of shareholding and the level of investment have achieved tremendous changes.Institutional investors have larger words in the process of corporate governance,and the way they participate in governance has changed from "voting by foot" to "voting by hand".With the development of modernization,people who own the ownership of a company can hinder their effective participation in corporate governance because of their limitation of ability.They can only entrust people with professional abilities to help them exercise their rights.The separation of ownership and management leads to the serious asymmetry of information inside the enterprise and forms the contradiction of agency.In order to alleviate contradictions and find ways to motivate and supervise managers,executive compensation system has become the breakthrough point of understanding contradictions,and it is also an important aspect of institutional investors involved in corporate governance.Institutional investors exercise supervision over executives,promote executive pay mechanism to become more scientific,and guide executives to actively participate in corporate governance and ease agency conflicts.In this paper,the empirical research and normative research,based on normative research,empirical research.Specifically,in the theoretical research,using the method of literature research,combing the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance,institutional investors on the level of executive compensation and the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors influence three aspects of domestic and foreign literature on executive compensation,and the institutional investors mechanism overview,introduces and analysis of the related theory,and put forward the hypothesis on the basis of theory.In the empirical study,based on theoretical assumptions,select the relevant indicators,combined with 2011-2015 in The Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Market listed experience data of 141 manufacturing enterprises,the establishment of the linear regression model using SPSS software for data,theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to demonstrate the interpretation.Institutional investors will be divided into independent institutional investors and investors in non independent institutions through the relationship between the concept of investment,capital source stability,and further subdivided independent institutional investors and independent institutions for verification of independent institutional investors and non independent institutional investors holding shares the stability of impact on executive compensation,and independent institutional investors is stable on the impact of executive compensation in different types of enterprises.Through empirical research and analysis,we draw the following conclusions:(1)the overall institutional investors’ shareholding has a significant positive relationship with executive compensation.(2)there is a significant positive relationship between independent institutional investors’ shareholding and executive compensation,while non independent institutional investors’ shareholding is not related to executive compensation.(3)In the stock is stable,whether independent institutional investors affect the stability and executive compensation has significant differences,but no significant difference between non independent institutional investors and executive compensation effect is stable.(4)the independent institutional investors with stable shareholding are better able to participate in corporate governance and improve the level of executive compensation.According to the research conclusion,put forward to perfect the Chinese securities market related laws and institutional investors,investment optimization training of long-term institutional investors in-depth reform of state-owned holding companies,investment and other four aspects of policy recommendations,hope to actively guide institutional investors to participate in corporate governance,improve the performance of the company to achieve a win-win situation.Compared with the similar research results,the paper analyzes the effect of institutional investors on executive compensation and corporate governance from the perspective of independence and stability.But there is also the interpretation of selected executive compensation variables,without considering the long-term benefits and equity incentive and control variables is not considered difficult to quantify variables,resulting in study limitations such as lack of a follow-up study,hope that. |
