Research On The Descision And Coordination For Competing Manufactures Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concerns

In recent years,the formation of buyer's market,the streamlining of purchasing and marketing process and the development of information technology have made the competition of supply chain more and more important.Influenced by the market demand side,in order to gain an inch of territory in the fierce competition,the competition between manufacturers for resources and elements has become increasingly fierce in the known market Red Sea.Therefore,maintaining the fair environment of the economic market,realizing the supply-demand matching of competitive supply chain node enterprises,and promoting the cost reduction and efficiency of the whole channel have become an important issue in the field of supply chain quality management.Considering the competing manufacturer's demand for channel equity,this paper combines dynamic game theory,contract coordination theory and fairness concern theory to construct a competitive supply chain model when manufacturer has different preferences for fair concern,discusses the impacts of fair concern on supply chain system,and designs an effective revenue-sharing contract to coordinate channel resource allocation.The conclusions are as follows:(1)When the manufacturer has the peer-induced fairness concern,under the constant market competition intensity,with the increase of the fair concern degree of the two manufacturers: 1)the wholesale price of the two manufacturers and the retail price of the retailers decrease,but the market demand of the products increases;2)the profits of the two manufacturers decrease,and the profits of the retailers and the supply chain as a whole increase.(2)When the manufacturer has the concern of fair distribution: 1)when the competition between the two manufacturers is fierce,the level of fairness concern of the manufacturer should have an upper bound;2)with the increase of the level of fair concern of the two manufacturers,the wholesale price and retail price will increase,and the market demand of the product will decrease;3)the profit of the retailer will increase with the level of fairness concern.The overall profits of manufacturers and supply chains depend on the level of fairness concern and competitiveness of manufacturers.(3)Comparing the supply chains with manufacturers' different preferences for fairness concern,we find that: 1)the optimal wholesale price of manufacturers and the optimal retail price of retailers are the largest when manufacturers have distributional fairness concern,followed by fair neutrality,and finally when peer-induced fairness concern;2)the optimal profit of retailers is the largest when manufacturers have peer-induced fairness concern,followed by fair neutrality and finally when distributional fairness concern;.3)The relationship between the manufacturer and the overall optimal profit of the supply chain is complex in three cases.(4)Whether the manufacturer induces fair concern or distributes fair concern,there exists a revenue-sharing contract parameter,which can realize Pareto improvement of supply chain,and the coordination condition has nothing to do with the degree of fair concern of manufacturer and the intensity of competition.