Research On Coordination Of Revenue Sharing Contract In Supply Chain Under Fairness Preference

With the rapid development of economic globalization and the arrival of the era of information technology, the competition between enterprises transformed into a competition between the supply chain and supply chain, and supply chain coordination is one of the most important tasks of supply chain management. Within formation asymmetry and selfish behavior, establishment of a coordination mechanism among the members is very important. Supply chain contract is the main way to achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain, through the design of contracts and set the appropriate parameters to help supply chain members to achieve risk-sharing, maximize supply chain profits. Previous studies are based on the decision-makers’ perfectly rational: maximing the total benefits is the decision-makers’ conduct. However in recent years, the impact of human factors on the supply chain behavior attracted the attention of the public decision-making scholars, policy makers considering behavioral factors, they don’t just the pursuit the maximum profit, sometimes they will consider whether to allocate income to equity, it gives a new research project for the traditional supply chain contracts.The first part of the paper considers one supplier and one retailer. the paper were studied as a fair concern to the Nash equilibrium point of reference, considering the retailer’s preferences, as well as taking into account the preferences of retailers and suppliers fair in both cases considering the cost of salvage and out on the basis of previous literature, establishing revenue sharing contract coordination model. First, we discussed the context based on the newsboy model to establish a fair concern Nash bargaining model framework, studies considered only coordinate the supply chain revenue sharing contract when retailers fairness preferences. Conclusion, the wholesale price and revenue sharing coefficient in the presence of a certain percentage, can contribute to the supply chain coordination, and had nothing to do with the retailer fair concern. Then, account the preferences of retailers and suppliers of fair conduct case, the revenue sharing contract coordination, as well as members of the supply chain optimal decision. We get conclusions, when retailers and suppliers taking unfair preference supply chain system is still able to achieve coordination, coordination at this time but is conditional. Finally, the results obtained by numerical simulation and in front of the same reasoning.The second part of the thesis, study of a complex supply chain structure, considering both retailers and suppliers order to start the game, introducing fair preference theory on this basis. Retailers were only fair considering the preferences, and we establish a revenue sharing contract coordination model. Obtained by numerical simulation: retailers a fair consideration of the concerns of distributed, retailers consider two distributed peer-induced fairness concerns and concerns of fairness, equity preference coefficient LIABLE both retailers and supply chain systems to produce optimal order quantity impact of the supply chain to achieve coordination.In this paper, we put the traditional supply chain contracts and equity concerns of behavior closely together, and the supply chain structure were extended from one to many situations, enrich and improve the traditional supply chain contract theory.