The Impact Of Retailer Subsidy On Supply Chain Reliability Coordination Strategy

In recent years,supply chain disruptions caused by natural disasters,man-made disasters,and political factors have been frequent,causing serious losses to enterprises.In enterprise management,how to reduce the loss of supply chain disruption becomes a big problem.Improving the reliability of the supply chain is the key to solving the problem.Its main strategies include back up supply,multi-source procurement,and supply chain member cooperation.Based on this,we study the conditions for suppliers to enable the standby supply line,the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy for the supplier's reliability construction cost,standby production cost subsidy or subsidy,and the supplier's optimal decision.By constructing the Stackelberg Game Model in the retailer's completely monopolized market,the retailer as the leader decides the subsidy amount and order quantity for the reliability construction cost and the standby production cost;the supplier as the follower determines the reliability of the supply chain,whether to enable the standby Optimal supply after production line and supply chain disruption.The inverse inductive method and MATLAB function are used to solve the optimal values of different strategies.The critical values,reliability levels,subsidy levels and profit functions of the alternate production lines under different strategies are compared and analyzed.On this basis,the expected profit model in the retailer's oligopoly market is constructed and solved to obtain the optimal value.The impact of retailer competition on the subsidy strategy is studied by comparing the optimal strategy with the retailer's complete monopoly.This thesis argues that retailers' subsidies for standby production costs will reduce supply chain reliability,and subsidies for reliability construction costs will increase.reliability.There are some market sizes,which make the retailer's subsidy strategy not effectively improve the reliability of the supply chain and the profit of the suppliers.When there is competition among retailers,the total market demand increases,but because of the “free rider” phenomenon between retailers,the total subsidy amount is reduced,so that the increase in total demand does not necessarily improve the reliability level of the supply chain.