Pricing And Capacity Decision In Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Product Differentiation Environment

In recent years,due to the economic development,the resource shortage and environmental pollution problems are becoming increasingly serious.The pricing and capacity management problems in closed-loop supply chain have gained more and more attention by scholars.In a closed-loop supply chain,there are usually existing differentiations in manufacturing process and final quality between new and remanufactured products which lead to the different capacity consumption of manufacturer and different preference and purchasing intention of market and consumer.Under the product differentiation environment,this thesis studies the pricing problem from the perspective of supplier and third-party collector being decision leader considering capacity constraint and studies the pricing and capacity management problem of decision-leader-manufacturer under different recovery mode in view of the shortcomings of the former studies.This thesis considers two closed-loop supply chain models according to the problems raised above.One closed-loop supply chain studies the optimal pricing,recycling and remanufacturing strategies in closed-loop supply chain from the perspective of suppliers and third-party recyclers in which the supplier and the third-party collector compete with each other and have more decision-making power than the capacity-constraint manufacturer.The second closed-loop supply chain analyzes the manufacturer's optimal pricing strategy and the optimal capacity investment and allocation strategy under the third-party collector recovery mode and manufacturer recovery mode.Based on the first closed-loop supply chain model,this thesis establishes two Stackelberg game models led by supplier and third-party collector respectively and one Nash game model.Based on the second closed-loop supply chain model,this thesis studies the optimal strategies considering two different recovery modes and design a revenue-cost sharing contract to analyze the coordination of the closed-loop supply chain.This thesis derives the optimal results of each model and gives important conclusions and management insights through theoretical research and numerical analysis.Managers can improve their profits by implementing advertising and promotional strategies to change the market preferences for new and remanufactured products,but they will fall into the dilemma between improving their own profits and improving the sustainability of closed-loop supply chains;when supplier or third-party collector are the followers in the decision-making process,they will get more profits and the supplier-led game model is the best scenario for the recycling and remanufacturing activities in the closed-loop supply chain.The manufacturer recovery mode is more profitable.Higher capacity investment cost will decrease the manufacturer's willingness to invest in more production capacity and decrease the total profits of the supply chain.The unit production capacity consumption coefficient is a critical factor for the manufacturer when making decisions on the optimal investment and allocation of the production capacity as well as the optimal pricing decisions.