Research On Contract Coordination Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Enterprise's Different Risk Preference

As the interest parties in the closed-loop supply chain will have contradictions and conflicts when pursuing the maximization of their own interests,leading to the decrease of operating performance in the overall supply chain,it is of important theoretical significance and practical value to design a reasonable coordination mechanism,which will solve the conflict between enterprises and achieve the best performance of the closed-loop supply chain.As multiple decision-making bodies in the closed-loop supply chains often face many uncertainties in the future when making decisions,the benefits and risks need to be considered simultaneously.Traditional research mostly assumes that policy makers are risk neutral.However,closed-loop supply chain companies often face different risks in the fierce competition.Decision makers often show different preferences in the face of different risks(risk aversion and risk neutral and risk preference).Therefore,when studying the contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to fully consider that policy makers have different risk preferences.This paper uses the M-CVaR risk measurement method in financial engineering to study the closed-loop supply chain contract coordination problem for decision makers with different risk preferences.Firstly,The Stackelberg game model of manufacturers and retailers is constructed in the forward supply chain system to use the M-CVaR risk measurement method to study the wholesale price contract,repurchase contract and revenue sharing contract coordination mechanism.It includes different risk preference retailers and risk-neutral manufacturers,different risk preference manufacturers and risk-neutral retailers,different risk preference manufacturers and different risk preference retailers in the forward supply chain system.The study found that: the retailer's optimal order quantity,the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price,the retailer's mixed conditional risk value and the manufacturer's mixed conditional risk value are affected by both the retailer's risk preference coefficient and the manufacturer's risk preference coefficient.The double influence of the impact depends on the retailer's own risk preference coefficient and the manufacturer's own risk preference coefficient.The risk value of the mixed condition of the supply chain system increases with the increase of the retailer's risk preference coefficient and the manufacturer's own risk preference coefficient;the contract parameter increases with the increase of retailer's risk preference coefficient;the contract parameter decreases with the increase of the manufacturer's risk preference coefficient.Then,The Stackelberg game model of manufacturers and retailers is constructed in the manufacturer's recycled closed-loop supply chain system to use the M-CVaR risk measurement method to study the repurchase contract coordination mechanism.It includes three different situations in the supply chain system-different risk preference retailers and risk-neutral manufacturers,different risk preference manufacturers and risk-neutral retailers,different risk preference manufacturers and different risk preference retailers.The study found that manufacturers and retailers can constantly negotiate to make the optimal wholesale price equal to the designed repurchase contract parameters,the entire closed-loop supply chain system can achieve coordination.The numerical analysis found that: the retailer's optimal ordering quantity increases with the increase of the retailer's risk preference coefficient,but non-decreasing with the increase of manufacturer's risk preference coefficient;the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price presents non-decreasing with the increase of its own risk preference coefficient,but nonincreasing with the increase of retailers' risk preference;Manufacturer's optimal recovery rate does not change significantly with the change of manufacturer's and retailer's risk preference coefficient;Retailer and manufacturer's optimal mixed conditional risk values present trend of increasing with both parties' risk preference coefficients;when the supply chain coordinates,the contract parameters increase with the increase of manufacturer's risk preference coefficient,change in non monotonic way with the increase of retailer's risk preference coefficient.Furthermore,The Stackelberg game model of manufacturers and retailers is constructed in the retailer's recycled closed-loop supply chain system to use the M-CVaR risk measurement method to study the repurchase contract coordination mechanism.It includes three different situations in the supply chain system-different risk preference retailers and risk-neutral manufacturers,different risk preference manufacturers and risk-neutral retailers,different risk preference manufacturers and different risk preference retailers.The study found that manufacturers and retailers can negotiate to adjust the optimal wholesale price and optimal recovery price.The numerical analysis found that: the retailer's optimal order quantity,the manufacturer's optimal recycling price,and the optimal mixed conditional risk value of the manufacturer and the supply chain system are affected by both the manufacturer's and the retailer's risk preference coefficient.Its effect is both non-monotonic increment and nonmonotonic decreasing.Retailers' optimal recovery rate is not affected notably by the risk preference coefficient of manufacturers and retailers;manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is non-monotonic increment and non-monotonic decreasing function of retailers' risk preference coefficient and its own risk preference coefficient non-increasing function.The retailer's risk value of optimal mixed condition increases with the increase of retailer's and manufacturer's risk preference coefficient;the contract parameter is the non-decreasing function of the retailer's risk preference coefficient and the non-increasing function of the manufacturers and retailers.Finally,The Stackelberg game model of manufacturers and retailers is constructed in the retailer's recycled closed-loop supply chain system to use the M-CVaR risk measurement method to study the repurchase contract coordination mechanism,different risk preference retailers and risk-neutral manufacturers and the third party recycler,different risk preference the third party recycler and risk-neutral manufacturers and retailers.If the manufacturer on the one hand continuously negotiates with the retailer to adjust the optimal wholesale price,and on the other hand with the third-party recycler to constantly adjust the optimal recovery price,the supply chain system can achieve coordination when the contractual conditions are met.Base on the difference of risk preference of enterprise in supply chain,the paper study on the contract coordination mechanism of nine types of risk portfolios.On the realistic requirement of the coordinated operation of the closed loop supply chain,expansibility analysis conditions and mechanism of three kinds of waste product recycling channels with risk preference.It makes up for the shortage of supply chain coordination research with simple risk combinations,and provides important theoretical support for the supply chain members with different risk preferences.This study not only improves the theory of closed-loop supply chain risk management to a certain extend,but also provides practical guidance for the design of the coordination contract of closed-loop supply chain under the combination risk preference of member enterprises.