Game Simulation Research On Credit Risk Of P2P Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

Agriculture is the foundation of the country,and the stability of agriculture is related to the health of the national economy.At present,China has vigorously promoted agricultural development and the process of agricultural modernization has been accelerating.However,the agricultural supporting financing system has not matched the development of modern agriculture.Farmers are unable to obtain loans from banks due to small loan amount,high risk,and high cost.Like many developing countries,financing difficulties have become an important obstacleto the further development of Chinese agricultural modernization.The combination of supply chain finance and agriculture has turned the uncontrollable risk of individual farmers into the overall controllable risks,which has solved the problem of farmers' financing difficulties to a certain extent.Therefore,this mode of operation is valued by the theory and policy.Attracted by the policy and market,many P2 P platforms have laid out agricultural supply chain finance areas.But the current level of development has a gap with the expectations of the theory and policy.About half of the P2 P platforms engaged in rural financial business have closed down or been in trouble,and a large part of them are caused by defaults of borrowing farmers.Therefore,it has great significance to increase the research on the credit risk under the P2 P agricultural supply chain financial model.Based on comparative analysis of P2 P agricultural supply chain finance and traditional agricultural lending,and banking supply chain financial differences,this paper sorts out the existing operating modes of 17 P2 P platforms engaged in agricultural supply chain finance,and concludes that "farmers + agricultural enterprises + P2 P platform","farmers + farmers professional cooperatives + agricultural enterprises + P2 P platform","farmers + industrial parks + agricultural enterprises + P2 P platform" and "farmers + warehousing enterprises + agricultural enterprises + P2 P platform" four operational models.Basing on the analysis of the operation models of agricultural supply chain finance and the risk characteristics of each operation model,the paper summarizes the characteristics of the credit risk under P2 P agricultural supply chain finance.Then three game models were extracted from the four types of operation modes,and the three types of game income matrix of “farmers and P2 P platforms”,“farmers,warehousing enterprises and P2 P platforms” and “farmers” were constructed respectively.On the basis,a bounded rational hypothesis is introduced,and the multi-group replicator dynamic model is used to solve the constraints of the former two equilibrium stable solutions.The single-group replicator dynamic model is used to solve the constraints of the latter equilibrium stable solution.Then the paper uses the simulink section of matlab to simulate and analyze the three models,observes the influence of the changes of each parameter on the game system,and gets the following results.(1)With the increase of the number of games,all three systems can achieve a stable state of mutual benefit.For the game between farmers and P2 P platform,the loan amount and borrowing rate are inversely proportional to the farmer's performance rate,which is directly proportional to the borrowing willingness of the P2 P platform;the borrowing operation cost of the P2 P platform has nothing to do with the farmer's compliance rate,and is inversely proportional to the platform's willingness to borrow;the reputation value of the farmer and the loss of the expelled supply chain are directly proportional to the farmer's compliance rate and the borrowing rate of the P2 P platform;farmers' recoverable debts and farmers' compliance rates are proportional to the P2 P platform's borrowing rate;the amount of guarantee for agricultural enterprises has nothing to do with the performance rate of farmers,and is proportional to the borrowing rate of P2 P platform.(2)For the game between farmers,warehousing enterprises and P2 P platform,the inventory pledge rate is proportional to the farmer's compliance rate,the warehousing enterprise's supervision rate and the P2 P platform's borrowing rate;The commissioned supervision fee which is paid by the P2 P platform to the warehousing enterprise has little impact on the supervision rate of the warehousing enterprise,and is inversely proportional to the borrowing rate of the P2 P platform;the penalty collected by the P2 P platform for the warehousing enterprise is not related to the farmer's compliance rateand the borrowing rate of the P2 P platform.It is direct proportion to the supervision rate of warehousing enterprises.(3)For the game within the farmer,the change in the maintenance rate of the farmer caused by the borrowing amount and the borrowing rate is similar to the change of the farmer's compliance rate during the game between the farmer and the P2 P platform.The impact of changes in farmers' recoverable debts on the maintenance rate of farmers is more significant;the group punishment faced by the farmers in default is directly proportional to the maintenance rate of the farmers;the losses caused by the farmers' defaults to other farmers are inversely proportional to the maintenance rate of the farmers.From the results of the simulation,the following suggestions are given.First,the P2 P platform should establish a long-term and stable cooperative relationship with the supply chain,which is beneficial to mutual benefit and win-win situation.Secondly,the P2 P platform should choose the appropriate agricultural supply chain for credit,and focus on reducing the costs.At the same time,the P2 P platform may strengthen the management of the flow of funds after the loan.Thirdly,it is difficult to encourage the warehousing enterprise to actively supervise the higher supervision of the warehousing enterprise in advance,and it is important to cooperate with the corresponding punishment measures.Finally,it is necessary to choose agricultural cooperatives that have strong binding force for farmers to cooperate.The higher the cost paid by farmers for exiting the production cooperatives,the more they tend to perform.In general,this paper applies evolutionary game and simulation methods to P2 P agricultural supply chain finance,and enriches the theoretical results of supply chain finance.The results of simulation have certain guiding value for P2 P platform to manage credit risk.