Risk Assessment And Game Simulation Of Supply Chain Finance Based On The Choice Of Core Business

SME financing is a long-term reality.Small and medium-sized enterprises for the demand for funds is very urgent,because SMEs are more in the market development and cultivation stage,in the supply chain is generally in a weak position,its operating cash flow is very tight.Competitive,large-scale core enterprises on the upstream and downstream SMEs are more powerful,often in the delivery,price,account and other terms of trade on the supporting enterprises have strict requirements,not only reflected in the strong bargaining power,but also Performance for the upstream and downstream of the account.From the perspective of the core business,accounting can bring operating cash flow,but from the supply chain point of view,the account will undoubtedly increase the fragile small and medium enterprises cash flow burden.For the core business,the stability of the upstream and downstream enterprises directly affect the supply of raw materials and product sales stability,heavy financial pressure is not conducive to the overall supply chain in the industry chain competition.With the deepening of the transformation and upgrading of Chinese enterprises,the economic status of small and medium-sized enterprises in China is also increasing,and the importance of promoting the rapid and healthy development of small and medium-sized enterprises is gradually highlighted.Supply chain finance to solve the problem of financing small and medium enterprises to provide a new idea,in recent years become China's commercial banks have to carry out business model.Its biggest innovation is that the credit model changes,requiring banks to break the original isolation of a single enterprise static credit thinking mode,to focus on the entire supply chain and its trading credit status.Supply chain finance in the main body of many,complex,the use of computer simulation can help us to visualize the complex phenomenon.Supply chain financing and customized credit line in 2005 to 2007 to become the international bank liquidity funds in the field of the two most important business growth.After more than a decade of development,supply chain finance related domestic academic achievements continue to appear,but for the choice of what kind of core enterprises can reduce the supply chain financial credit risk research rarely.This paper first introduces the characteristics of supply chain finance,the characteristics and influencing factors of supply chain financial credit risk,andexpounds the operation process and credit risk identification of supply chain financial receivables.Secondly,the use of game theory,around the core business for the supply chain financial accounts receivable model established three credit risk game model-accounts receivable financing mode of bank-enterprise game,consider the "hidden equity",Small and medium enterprises internal game model.Finally,the dynamic model of the replicator based on bounded rational thought,reinforcement learning and imitation learning is used to simulate the three models respectively.By changing the different parameters in the model,the influence of different factors on the financial risk of the supply chain is analyzed.Finally,To make recommendations.In this paper,through the game and simulation simulation,the following conclusions:For the bank-enterprise game model of the receivable financing mode,under the complete information game,assuming that the game is a game,the Nash equilibrium is(no loan,default,no repayment),the three-way income is 0;When the penalty for small and medium enterprises T and the punishment of the core business is large enough,there is Nash equilibrium(loan,compliance,repayment),is Pareto efficient.In the incomplete information game,when considering the implied equity when the bank's expected earnings,there is Nash equilibrium(loan,compliance,repayment).Core enterprises and small and medium enterprises to take the probability of the same time as a variable,reducing the credit requirements for SMEs.At this point,the core business and small and medium enterprises as long as the ability to repay,will be compliance,receivables financing can be sustained,the three parties will be long-term interests.The evolutionary results of the replication dynamic system from the bank-enterprise multiplayer game.Indicating that the increase in the core business and small and medium enterprises to stimulate the negative or positive stimulus can significantly improve the core business of small and medium enterprises breach of contract,credit risk reduction.In the case of a complete information game,whether to consider the implicit equity does not affect the equilibrium result.In the incomplete information game,consider the implicit equity,the three parties are more likely to reach(loans,compliance,repayment)Nash equilibrium,the bank expected earnings will be higher.In addition,through an example analysis,we can see that under the condition of implicit equity,the banks will be more willing to provide financing services,which is weak in the supply chain Small and medium enterprises in terms of significant significance.In this paper,the convergence rate of the trajectory is accelerated and the convergence speed of the trajectory is almost constant,and the number of games required is reached when the implicit equity is considered.Significantly reduced.Indicating that when considering implicit equity,credit risk is reduced,banks are more willing to provide financing services.For the internal game model of small and medium-sized enterprises,under the complete information game,assuming that the game is a game,the Nash equilibrium is(betrayal,betrayal),the two sides are;for repeated game,when the small and medium enterprises betrayed T is large enough,There is Nash equilibrium(maintenance,maintenance),is Pareto efficient.In the incomplete information game,when the punishment of small and medium enterprises betraying T is large enough,the difference between maintenance proceeds and betrayal earnings is constant,when the SME loan group has Nash equilibrium(maintenance,maintenance,...maintenance).At this point,small and medium enterprises in the group as long as the ability to repay,will choose to maintain the strategy,receivables financing can be sustained,all small and medium enterprises within the group will be long-term interests.From the results of the evolution of the default probability of small and medium-sized enterprise loan groups,it is concluded that the small and medium-sized enterprise loans group has long-term stability and maintain the trustworthy state of the prerequisite is: First,when all small and medium enterprises in the group choose the maintenance strategy when the greatest gains.Second,the small and medium-sized enterprises within the group is mutually beneficial cooperation and there is no obvious conflict of interest.This is closely related to the core enterprise's supply chain management capabilities.