Research On Credit Default Of Local Public Sectors In Government-pay PPP Projects

As an important method of promoting the reform of investment and financing system of public projects,accelerating the process of urbanization,improving the quality of public service supply and eliminating the debt risk of local governments,PPP mode has been widely used from 2014.With the increasing application of PPP mode in recent years,the contingent expenditure responsibility of local public sectors has gradually accumulated.The risk of credit default of PPP projects,especially government pay PPP projects based on local public expenditure,has increased sharply,which seriously threatens the sustainability of project cooperation.Therefore,it is imperative to explore the logic of credit default in local public sectors and put forward corresponding governance ideas.This paper taken local public sectors in government-pay PPP projects as the research subject.By using literature research method,model analysis method and theoretical research method,this paper systematically analyzed the action logic,source factors and governance ideas of credit default in local public sectors which laid a foundation for the follow-up research.Firstly,this paper reviewed the development of PPP mode in China,explained the main characteristics of the government pay mechanism and briefly introduced the risk of credit default in local public sectors of government pay PPP projects under the background of the implementation of the PPP market from "stepping on the accelerator" to "stepping on the brake" from 2014 to 2018.Secondly,this paper referred to the public choice theory and the "Campaign-Style" governance theory which helped analyze the organizational logic behind the large-scale promotion and halt of the government pay PPP projects in China,and explored the causes of the "fake PPP" projects.This paper used the theory of institutional change to analyze the path dependence and lock-in effect of the evolution from traditional financing platform mode or BT mode to PPP mode in the field of infrastructure investment and financing,and put forward the stage equilibrium of the implementation of PPP mode in China under the coupling effect of formal rules and informal constraints.Thirdly,from two aspects of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard",this paper summarized the failure logic of the local public sectors in the government pay PPP projects."Adverse selection" includes administrative performance and fiscal illusion.This study used administrative governance paradigm to analyze the conflict between "individual rationality" and "collective rationality" in local public sectors and compared the payment pressure of various public project construction modes.Building Construction Project Incentive Function(CPIF)to explain the source of fiscal illusion of local public sectors.The level of moral hazard includes subjective willingness and objective limitation.The subjective willingness of local public sectors was analyzed from the angle of initial cost,transaction cost and production cost.The objective limitation faced by local public sector were summarized from two aspects: the approval system of government pay PPP projects and the professional reserve of local public sectors.Next,by literature review,15 typical cases of government pay PPP projects in China were summarized.According to the severe level of credit default in local public sectors,the logical combination of serious dishonesty in local public sectors in government-paid PPP projects,namely "political performance * fiscal illusion" and "fiscal illusion * subjective willingness * objective limitation",were identified by using Crisp sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis(CsQCA).Then the research discussed the results accordingly.Finally,taking the characteristics of all stages of government pay PPP projects and the governance paradigm of the public sectors into account,four Governance ideas were proposed to deal with the credit default of the local public sectors based on perspectives of new institutional economics and politics: building a credit platform of public sectors in PPP projects,Adjusting the incentive structure for administrative promotion,Establishing an independent PPP project supervisory authority and Improving the retreat of PPP projects exit mechanism.