Executive Compensation Gap?Property Rights And Firm Performance

Such as Hengda Group to employ economic analyst Ren Zeping as chief economist and out of 15 million annual salary "super high" events occurred frequently in recent years,the focus of public attention has been focused on enterprises in the core position of the executive body,high executive compensation distortion is more remarkable.Is it true that the listed companies in China have a scientific,effective and reasonable salary system with a reasonable gap? Is it effective to motivate managers? How to maximize the incentive effect of the salary system? In the process of the design of the enterprise salary system,there are many problems to be solved.Manufacturing is an important cornerstone for supporting the rapid development of China's economy.I hope this study can provide a basis for the design of Future Ltd's governance structure and salary incentive effect,and put forward corresponding policies and suggestions,in order to bring impetus to the development of enterprises.This paper selects 2012-2016 A shares of listed manufacturing companies as the research sample,using the method of combining normative research and empirical research,study the relationship between manufacturing enterprises listed on the executive team of internal and external salary gap and corporate performance,the property for further analysis of the relationship between the two variables,trying to keep the improvement and development of management accounting knowledge and the theory of corporate governance system,the Chinese listed companies executive compensation incentive system is more abundant,and the reasonable way to improve the business performance of the extension and complement.This article is divided into six parts according to the theme.The first part,the introduction.After analyzing the background,purpose and significance of the research,this paper determines the topic of this article,and selects the research method of the article,and points out the innovation of the research.The second part is the literature review.Through reviewing the relevant literatures at home and abroad,confirming the innovation point,this paper reviews the related literatures on the internal and external gap between the executive pay and the enterprise performance,and sums up the previous research methods and ideas.The third part,related concepts and theoretical analysis.By defining the related concepts involved in this paper,clarifying the problems studied,and then briefly expounding the relevant basic theory of the executive pay gap,improving the persuasive power of this paper in theoretical research,and analyzing the theory.Based on the actual situation of Chinese listed companies ' executives,the paper puts forward research hypotheses.Part IV,research hypothesis and design.Based on the actual situation of Chinese listed companies,this paper puts forward the research hypothesis,and establishes the corresponding model for the different hypotheses mentioned in the previous section,and explains the variables involved in the model briefly.Part five,empirical analysis.The data are descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis and linear regression analysis through Excel and STATA13.0 software,and the hypothesis is established based on the regression results.Part VI,research conclusions and prospects.By summing up the results of the empirical analysis,this paper draws the conclusion,and puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions,discusses the deficiencies of this study and provides the direction for the next research.The conclusions of this study are as follows,the internal and external positive executive compensation gap can enhance the performance of enterprises in a certain extent,and the gap is large,the incentive effect is more obvious;in considering joining the differences in the nature of property rights of enterprises,state-owned enterprises in the study found that the Executive compensation gap can also improve the incentive and enterprise performance,but due to the political background of state corporate executives and the complexity of the appointment mechanism,the incentive effect than non state-owned enterprises will significantly weaken.