Research On The Relation Of Executive Compensation,Concentration Of Ownership And Enterprise Performent

The problem of executive pay and enterprise performance has been paid attention by all social.In modern enterprises,the owners do not directly participate in the management of the enterprise,but entrust the executive to manage.However,a series of principal-agent problems will arise because of the asymmetric information between the owner and the executive.In order to solve the problem of agency effectively,it is necessary to set up a reasonable incentive mechanism for executive compensation.In addition,in the case of centralization and decentralization,the management decision-making power that the executive can really master is different.So the relationship between the executive pay and the enterprise performance will be influenced by the concentration degree of ownership.Based on the situation concluded above,does executive pay have a catalytic effect on the performance of the enterprise? Under the special social background of China,is there any difference in the influence of executive compensation on the performance of enterprises with different property rights? How does the ownership concentration affect the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance? To solve these problems,this paper takes the method of the combination of theoretical research and empirical analysis,puts the executive pay,ownership concentration and corporate performance in an analytical framework for the research on the base of the nature of property rights.In this paper,firstly,by combing the previous research results,the author draws out the theoretical basis of principal-agent theory and incentive theory,and puts forward hypotheses according to the relevant theoretical analysis.Secondly,this paper takes 2010-2016 years of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares non-financial enterprises as the research object,based on the property right property,analyzes the sample data by group,compares the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise performance,and whether the concentration of ownership plays a moderating role.It is found that executive monetary remuneration has a positive effect on enterprise performance,and in state-owned enterprises,and the positive effect of the executive monetary remuneration on the performance of the enterprise is stronger than that of the non-state-owned enterprises;the executive consumption has a significant negative effect on the performance of the enterprise,and the negative effect of the state-owned enterprises is stronger than that of the non-state-owned enterprises.In state-owned enterprises,the concentration degree of ownership has a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between executive monetary remuneration and corporate performance.However,there is no regulation function in non-state-owned enterprises,and in state-owned enterprises,there is no significant moderating effect on the relationship between executive consumption and corporate performance.But there is a significant negative adjustment in non-state-owned enterprises.Different from the existing research,this paper put the executive pay,the concentration of ownership and enterprise performance in a framework,studying of the impact of executive and corporate performance,and the regulation of ownership concentration degree.In some extent,it provides a new perspective and ideas for the future related research.In addition,this paper highlights the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise performance in different types of enterprises,and concludes that it can provide reference for the relationship between state-owned enterprises and Non-state-owned enterprises in dealing with executive compensation and enterprise performance,and provide pertinence suggestions for enterprises to improve their performance,which has certain theoretical and practical significance.