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Research On The Accounts Receivable Financing Decisions Of The SME

Posted on:2019-01-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F DongFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330545995914Subject:Quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:
The SMEs in the “13th Five-Year Plan” gold development period have created an inexhaustible motive force to promote the growth of the national economy,not only increase fiscal revenue,but also relieve the employment pressure.But it is undeniable that,due to a series of reasons such as low assets,large business risk and insufficient collateral,the difficulty of financing for SMEs have always hampered the development of the company.As a major cause of financial constraints,a large number of accounts receivable occupy the huge cost of business operation,especially for SMEs with low capital stock.The supply-chain receivables financing model uses the creditworthiness of core companies to provide guarantees for SMEs,helping SMEs to overcome the disadvantages of their failing to get financing.This not only reduces the bank’s loan risk,but also increases the efficiency and value of the entire supply chain.And it can become a more beneficial financing model in the environment of intensifying market competition.This paper focuses on financing constraints for SMEs and discusses financing decisions under the supply chain accounts receivable model.Firstly,the paper define SMEs and introduce the three models of supply chain finance,and interpret the characteristics and types of accounts receivable financing model.Secondly,the author use game theory to establish the accounts receivable game model under the traditional model and supply chain finance model.Through the tripartite game between bank-enterprise single-line games and banks,small and medium-sized enterprises,and core companies under the two models,a revenue matrix was constructed and implemented.In a balanced comparison,we can include that the way of accounts receivable financing in supply chain can change the Nash equilibrium under the traditional model,and achieve a Pareto efficient balance that is more beneficial to all three parties of the game.At the same time,the conditions for achieving the Nash equilibrium need to be met.Afterwards,based on the real-time transaction process and dynamic game under incomplete information,the two-tier supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single manufacturer is studied for the supply chain financingmodel of accounts receivable,in which the supplier is a capital-constrained upstream company,the manufacturer is the core companies that buy products from suppliers.Assume that the bank is a risk-averse person,the default rate of the supplier is endogenous,the manufacturer does not default,a financing model for tripartite cooperation on suppliers,manufacturers,and banks is established to study the optimal loan-to-value ratio of the bank,and the optimal order quantity of the manufacturer,and the optimal production volume of the supplier.Finally,the paper uses game theory and numerical simulation to analyze the variables such as loan value ratio,accounts receivable amount,the deposit ratio and loan ratio that affect the bank’s income and the optimal order quantity of suppliers.This study helps all participating parties in the supply chain to seek effective financing solutions and provides references for banks and other financial institutions to explore the supply chain receivables business.
Keywords/Search Tags:Supply Chain Finance, Accounts Receivable, Financing Decisions, Numerical Simulation
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