The Coordination Of False Failure Returns With The Effects Of Retailing Sales Effort

Under the background of E-Supply Chain Management,in this article,we build the model of coordinating false failure returns with both Buy-Back Contract and Target-Rebate Contract.The main purpose of this model is to provide incentive for supplier to order more items and put more effort,thereafter the total profit of the supply chain could also be improved.The main contents are as follows: Firstly,we take a literature review about E-Supply Chain Management,False Failure Returns Management and Supply Chain Contract Management.Secondly,we compare the advantage of Target Rebate Contract with other contracts.Since most of the researchers focus the impact of retailing sales effort on pricing in the supply chain,and the main incentive mechanisms are effort Cost Sharing Contract,Buyback Contract,few of them considered the effect of Target Rebate Contract.Then we build the contract modeling with Rebate Contract and Target Rebate Contract without the effect of retailing sales effort,illustrating the advantage of Target Rebate Contract.Thirdly,we shift our attention from order quantity to the impact of retailing sales effort to the stakeholders in the supply chain.It is necessary and accessible to build a coordinating contract whose decisive variable is retailing sales effort.Besides,this type of contract is helpful in reducing false failure returns and lowering the cost of handling returns.Fourthly,by having numerical analysis,we compare the supply chain performance under different scenarios.Lastly,we derive some managerial implications from modeling analysis.Both Buyback and Target Rebate Contract can only achieve a sub-optimal profit,only by combing them,can we conclude that the sales effort efficiency affects total supply chain and participants' profit,as well as their contract bias and choices.