Research On The Economic Model Of Bilateral Matching Between Medical Institutions And Graduates

Employment is the people's livelihood fundamental[1].At present,with the continuous expansion of institutions of higher learning,there are a large number of graduates every year,for graduates without practical experience,but also to the University and the community to pay more attention.Objective:Complete the Two-sided matching model applicable to the Chinese medicine colleges and universities graduates employment.Put the employment of university graduates based on the theory of the Two-sided match matching model is applied to a college class of 2016 for medical graduates.This paper uses Two-sided matching model of college graduates employment and related algorithms to provide suggestions and methods for the employment of College graduates.Methods:In the early stage of the study,through the collection and collation of relevant documents and policies,we can understand the definition and application conditions of Two-sided matching theory,and understand the application and development of Two-sided matching theory in the economic field.Through telephone interviews or face to face interviews with a pharmaceutical university employment guidance center related management personnel to understand the reality of a medical college employment guidance center.Through the expert consultation method to seek the application conditions of the model and the related suggestions of the medical and health institutions and the post graduates preference scale design.In view of the target audience for a medical college graduates and health care and related institutions,and design a corresponding new graduates preference scale,health care and related institutions jobs preference scale,investigate their preference ordering,through the questionnaire survey to collect the relevant data,effectively ensure the comprehensiveness of data collection,authenticity and accuracy.Through the simulation software MATLAB to simulate the reality demonstrated utility.Secondly analyze the collected data,the use of Gale Shapley algorithm and Boston mechanism to empirical data collected calculus,matching the appropriate health care and related institutions post-graduates combination,to provide reasonable suggestions for graduating graduates and choice.The results of simulation and empirical economics of utility comparison analysis.Results:1 Simulation results:The simulation results show that the G-S algorithm and Boston algorithm in the simulation of the number of graduates for 2500 people,the other side of the medical institutions positions,there are three cases:The total number of medical institutions for medical post 600,the total number of jobs for 500 of the total number of institutions and medical institutions post 400,have come to the same rules,G-S algorithm and Boston algorithm can be popularized.The G-S algorithm and Boston algorithm many times,many graduates and medical institutions of utility value in a certain range and the coefficient of variation was in the range of 0-0.02,medical institutions and post graduate Two-sided matching model of the G-S algorithm and Boston algorithm with stability.Two-sided matching theory is suitable for graduate employment.2 Empirical results:The biggest highlight is the reality of actual situation compared with the simulation stage,through the questionnaire survey from medical institutions and graduates of each other's preference weight,this is the innovation of two-sided matching theory in empirical aspect,a traditional Chinese medicine for medical institutions and graduates of bilateral matching,it can also provide reference guidance for the other type of school.The employment preference of the medical college graduates and the recruitment preference of the medical institutions show the Matthew effect,which is in line with the reality.The empirical results are consistent with the simulation results in the Two-sided matching model of medical institutions.When the active reporting party for graduates,passive prescription as the medicine institutions,the total utility of G-S algorithm is 6318.30,2.46%higher than the Boston algorithm;When the active reporting party as the medicine mechanism,passive prescription for graduates,the total utility of G-S algorithm is 6283.90,9.60%higher than the Boston algorithm,The total utility of the G-S algorithm in the Two-sided matching model of the medical institutions and graduates is higher than that of the Boston algorithm.When the active reporting party as the medical institutions,passive decision for graduates,the G-S algorithm results utility for medical institutions to 3170.30,graduates utility to 3113.60,the medical institutions utility is higher than the graduates utility.When the active reporting party for graduates,passive prescription as the medicine mechanism,the G-S algorithm obtains the results for graduates of utility value is 3168.80,medical institution utility value is 3149.50,the graduates utility is higher than the medical institutions utility.Choose active reporting party as the medicine mechanism,passive decision algorithm G-S for graduates,medical institutions will get more efficient use;Select the active declaration for graduates,the passive side of the decision for the medical institutions of the G-S algorithm,graduates will get a higher utility,the choice of specific algorithms,depending on the situation.Conclusions:The Two-sided matching theory is applied in the field of employment,G-S algorithm and Boston algorithm results in both the stability and generalization.To build institutions for medical post graduate with Two-sided matching model.Combined with the reality of the actual situation,through the questionnaire survey from medical institutions and graduates of each other's preference weight,this is the innovation of two-sided matching theory in empirical aspect,for a two-sided matching Chinese medicine medical institutions and graduates,can also provide reference guidance for the other types of schools.The employment preference of the medical college graduates and the recruitment preference of the medical institutions show the Matthew effect,which is in line with the reality.The empirical results are consistent with the simulation results in the Two-sided matching model of medical institutions.The total utility of the G-S algorithm in the Two-sided matching model of the medical institutions and graduates is higher than that of the Boston algorithm.Choose active reporting party for medical institutions,passive decision for graduates of the G-S algorithm,medical institutions will receive higher utility.Choose active reporting party for graduates,passive judgment of G-S algorithm for medical institutions,graduates will receive a higher utility.Specific selection of which algorithm,depending on the circumstances.Medical institutions and post graduate Two-sided matching model can save manpower and time cost of both sides,which is the most efficient and effective matching platform for medical institutions and graduates.Ease of contact with the university is not deep,the lack of contact with the University of the reasons for the agency of medical institutions recruitment difficulties.