Research On The Game Of Introducing Private Capital Into Infrastructure PPP Projects In Underdeveloped Areas

Private investment is an important part of China's investment.Since 2016,the growth rate of private investment has slowed down markedly,even some regions showing negative growth like Yunnan Province.The overall level of private investment shows such characteristics as small amount,slow growth rate and small proportion of investment whereas the investment by state-owned enterprises has grown rapidly,which demonstrates a sharp contrast.Although the national and local governments are encouraging an increasing numbers of private investment policies,the effect of these polices has been greatly restricted due to the poor economic conditions and inefficient policy implementation in underdeveloped regions.The urgent stimulation is quite necessary for the vitality of private investment.In this thesis,the main problems affecting the vitality of private investment in undeveloped regions are firstly identified through the Object-Oriented Project Planning(ZOPP/OOPP)method,thus forming a “problem list and tree”.Then,based on the results of expert scoring and AHP analysis,the target list and target group for problem solutions are established to illustrate the two dimensions of policy improvement-"direct stimulation" and "indirect stimulation" of private investment policy optimization.Direct stimulation is to positively guarantee the investment income of private capital by means of income distribution optimization and etc.whereas indirect stimulation is achieved by the "Exit Mechanism" design to ensure a reasonable income of private investors and solutions to their investment concerns.On the direct stimulation in the improvement of private investment policy,the project's financial benefit and national economic benefit are used as the “utility” to establish a game model between government and social capital from the perspectives of income distribution,risk sharing and administrative process optimization.It's concluded through the demonstration of the change of utility between two players in the game that the prior improvement of administrative process optimization is most helpful to stimulate the vitality of private investment in underdeveloped regions.And on the indirect stimulation,the government and social capital are used as the two game players to establish an evolutionary game model.Through the establishment of the related party's payment function and the replication dynamic equation under different strategies,the evolution process of the stability strategy is explained,and the factors affecting the decision-making of both parties are analyzed.Using government as the main part to explain the attraction of social capital participation and social restriction under different exit modes.The strategy of abnormal capital withdrawal from projects provides a reference for the formulation and improvement of public sector exit mechanism policies.