Research On Bidding Strategy Adjustment In M&A From The Perspective Of Game Theory

Merger and Acquisition plays an important role in the process of transformation and upgrading of an enterprise.From an industry perspective,successful mergers and acquisitions can accelerate the formation of some new dynamic industries,technologies and formats.At present,there is downward pressure on domestic economic growth and structural imbalance is more prominent.The central government has put forward the strategic concept of new and old kinetic energy conversion to promote and guide the formation of new economic development momentum.Mergers and acquisitions,if properly used,can shorten the time of transformation and upgrading.However,merger and acquisition is a complex process.The success of merger and acquisition is reflected in the decision-making process.There are many factors that affect the participants in the decision-making process.This paper studies the decision-making links of mergers and acquisitions,analyzes the mechanism and factors influencing the decision-making in the process of mergers and acquisitions,and provides a more easily grasped theoretical basis for the decision-making links of mergers and acquisitions and the factors that should be paid attention to in order to improve the success rate of mergers and acquisitions.From the perspective of game theory,this paper puts forward the hypothetical conditions and establishes the game matrix for the decision-making links between management and shareholders,controlling shareholders and minority shareholders based on the game theory under rational assumptions,and analyzes the equilibrium results.Based on the evolutionary game theory under the condition of bounded rationality,this paper studies the dynamic changes of the two sides in the decision-making process between the main merger enterprise and the target enterprise,establishes the complex state equation and the phase diagram of the two sides,and makes the location map of the stalemate state,the stable state and the possible transition path for the main merger enterprise and the target enterprise.During the decision-making process,the dynamic process of how the two sides react and interact with each other is also analyzed.This paper finds that when the interests between the controlling shareholders and the management are different,the management has the information superiority,and has the tendency to make decisions in favor of itself rather than the controlling shareholders.In the merger and acquisition activities of companies with dispersed shareholdings,if the controlling shareholders choose to increase shareholdings by a large margin to pay the merger and acquisition consideration,the shareholdings of the minority shareholders will be greatly diluted,which will inevitably lead to the minority shareholders to vote against the plan.The conclusion of this paper is that the combination of cash payment and share payment should be considered.The third discovery of this paper is that the decision-making mechanism between the main merger enterprise and the target enterprise is based on the other party's action,that is,judging the probability of the other party agreeing to the merger and acquisition conditions,the party who first discovers the other party's information changes and makes timely adjustments will have the advantage of negotiation.The conclusion of this paper is to get as much information as possible from the other side in the process of merger and acquisition,and transmit the change of the information of the other side to the other side effectively,so that the other side thinks that the probability of consent of the other side has decreased,and at the same time,when the interest has to be transferred,we can test the bottom line of the other side's consent conditions by "multiple small margins".Maximize the interests of one's own party.Finally,two actual M&A cases,one successful M&A and one unsuccessful M&A,are used to verify the proposed model,which reflects the practical significance of the model.