A Research On Enterprise R&D Strategy Selection In The Light Of Option Game Theory

The competition policy of companies in the field of technical innovation and new technology adoption was generally called research and development, but uncertainty is the basic feature of development strategies. The uncertainty of the enterprise development is mainly from the two sides:one is a technical uncertainty; two is the market uncertainty. As the further development of real option theory in the study of develop strategies, the interactive features of development is more important for the right development choice of enterprises. So with the combination of real option and game theory, considering real option value under uncertainty, and also conclude the value of the interactive decision, has become the study frontiers.The paper study the choice of enterprises R&D strategy using option game theory, and establishes a two stages of the enterprise development model for two firms. In the traditional development model, spillover effect of R&D is considered only, but in reality, because of security of the enterprise development information and timeliness of development process, spillover effect of R&D should be a correlation R&D information. The so-called information correlation is that the outcome of the leader's R&D will influent the follower's. On the basis of the model, we have made some synthetic data to test the model. In the simulation analysis, we find that both the firms will invest if the total value of the new product development become higher, and the enterprise which has higher success rate of R&D will invest at first in a lower target development market value. Thus, we can see that the new product development market value is an important influence factors of enterpriser's R&D decision.From simulation analysis, we can find:When the development market value is low, firm A and firm B will select the wait strategy. As the target market value increased, firm A will choose to incest in R&D at first, because firm A has a higher rate of success development more than firm B's, so firm B could only choose to wait. As the target market value further increased, there will be two Nash equilibriums, one party may choose to develop and the other party has to choose to follow. At last, when the target market value is enough higher, both two firms will choose to develop investment, because the benefits from R&D will far exceeds its own development costs and thereby give up the follow strategy.