A Study On The Effect Of The Incentive Given To Managers Of State-owned Enterprises:Based On Perspective Of Double Identity

State-owned enterprises have both public and enterprise nature.Such characteristics of duality give them economic and non-economic goals at the same time.In order to motivate executives to achieve the dual goals,state-owned enterprises have established a diversified incentive mechanism consists of market-based incentives(like compensation incentive and forced turnover)and non-market incentives(like promotion).In the face of these incentives,executives have different cognitions of managers and officials,and then behave differently to achieve the corresponding goals.When the level of firm performance is at different stages,the executive will make a trade-off between different incentives,which will affect the effectiveness of incentives.To clarify the correspondence between different incentives and the dual objectives of state-owned enterprises,and to explore the effectiveness of incentives in enterprises with different performance levels,samples of compensation incentive,forced turnover and promotion is selected within state-owned listed enterprises from 2010 to 2016.Firstly,the relationship between incentives,enterprise performance and social responsibility is examined.According to the empirical results,compensation incentive is positively correlated with enterprise performance while it's unrelated to social responsibility.Forced turnover is negatively correlated with enterprise performance while it's unrelated to social responsibility.Promotion is positively related to social responsibility while it has no relation to enterprise performance.In other words,compensation incentive and forced turnover,as market-based incentives,only support the economic goal of state-owned enterprises.So their incentive effects can be measured by the correlation between incentives and enterprise performance.As a non-market incentive,promotion only supports the non-economic goals and its incentive effect can be measured by the correlation between incentive and social responsibility.Thereafter,referring to the performance of industry,the sample is divided into three groups in order to test the effect of each incentive in firms with different performance levels.The results show that the effectiveness of compensation incentive is only significant in firms with commonly performance.The effectiveness of forced turnover is only significant in poorly-performed firms,and in firms with commonly performance,the effectiveness is not significant.Particularly,in well-performed firms,forced turnover is positively related to firm performance,suggesting the alienation of incentive.As for promotion,its effectiveness is only significant in well-performed firms,when the positive relation of promotion and performance is also significant.The effectiveness of promotion is insignificant in firms with commonly or poor performance.Moreover,in poorly-performed firms,the incentive twisted as promotion shows negative relation to performance.These results show the applicability of different incentives in firms with different performance,in the same time,they inflect some defects of incentive mechanism in the state-owned enterprises:Influenced by salary regulation and the defect of enterprise's internal governance mechanism,compensation incentive is ineffective in well-performed or poorly-performed state-owned enterprises.And due to the lack of benchmarking in the performance assessment of state-owned enterprises,the incentive of forced turnover and promotion twisted in well-performed or poorly-performed firms.In the end,some suggestions to these problems is proposed.The innovative points of this article is analyzing the mechanism of diversified incentive and double identity of managers,building the pyramid model of the incentives in state-owned enterprise,and comparing the effectiveness of incentives under different performance levels through group study,which provides a reference for the state-owned enterprises to design proper incentive mechanism.