A Study On The Impact Of Listed Companies' Equity Incentive Plan On Financial Performance

In modern corporate governance,the principal-agent problem has always been a prominent problem in the theoretical and practical circles.In order to solve the principal-agent problem between the owner and the operator,the agency cost is reduced and the equity incentive mechanism should be transferred and students.Equity incentive is a long-term incentive mechanism for senior executives and key technical personnel of the enterprise.The equity incentive is granted to the shareholders of the enterprise and the shareholders of the management and the enterprise share the risks and share the proceeds.However,the problem of equity incentive is becoming more and more obvious in practice,which affects the long-term incentive effect of stock option incentive and hinders the development of stock option incentive.Foreign equity incentive practice for a long time,on the equity incentive related research than domestic mature,but in China's special institutional context,foreign research literature may be the actual situation of China's equity incentive gap and discrepancies.Therefore,it is necessary to study the equity incentive plan of listed companies in China based on the actual situation in China,and clear the obstacles for the development of equity incentive plan in our country.On the basis of reading a large number of domestic and foreign equity incentive-related research literature,this article studies the relationship between the equity incentive plan and the long-term operating performance of listed companies in China.First,this paper analyzes the concept and theory of equity incentive.Secondly,it describes and analyzes the status quo of equity incentive plan of listed companies in our country.At present,there are three options of stock option incentive,such as stock option,restricted stock and stock appreciation right,and the main source of the subject matter The way of setting up the incentive object or the grant price is mainly based on the lower limit stipulated in the "Administrative Measures(Trial)".The waiting period and the lock-up period shall be short,and the incentive shall be granted.The proportion of the object to granted a lower proportion of features.Thirdly,this paper discusses the problem of how to set up and implement the stock option incentive plan of listed companies in China,such as loose condition of exercising right,fixing fixed price of exercise price,turnover of senior management,management of earnings management and working expense.Then,using multiple regression analysis of the 2013-2015 panel data of the A-share listed companies with the implementation of the stock option incentive plan in 2013,it is found that the proportion of shareholding incentive is significantly positively correlated with the long-term performance of the listed companies.Growth and size and performance were significantly positively correlated.Finally,the author draws the conclusion and puts forward the appropriate policy suggestion: the enterprise should formulate the equity incentive plan in the light of its own situation,enhance the self-identity of the senior executives in the enterprise,strengthen the enterprise supervision and improve the independence of the management.