Dynamic Reputation-based Contract Incentive Mechanism In Mobile Crowdsourcing Network

In recent years,with the comprehensive development of wireless communications and mobile networks and the rapid rise of the Internet of Things,mobile crowdsourcing has become a popular collaboration model.In this model,mobile users involved in completing mobile crowdsourcing tasks will consume limited resources and bear the security risks of privacy exposure,and mobile smart devices are always controlled by crowdsourcing participants.However,the private behavior of mobile users cannot be monitored in real time,resulting in network information asymmetry.At the same time,many existing long-term repetitive mobile crowdsourcing tasks need to be completed,and motivating mobile users to actively participate in long-term mobile crowdsourcing tasks and make efficient data sharing is the key to the research in this paper.Therefore,this paper is dedicated to studying the dynamic contract incentive mechanism of mobile crowdsourcing network based on reputation strategy to solve the above problems.(1)Aiming at the problem of information asymmetry between software service providers and mobile users in a long-term mobile crowdsourcing network,this paper proposes a two-phase mobile crowdsourcing network dynamic incentive mechanism design method based on contract theory.Aiming at the respective characteristics of software service providers and mobile users in a mobile crowdsourcing network,based on the establishment of a software service provider and mobile user model,and on the premise of ensuring the personal rational constraints and incentive compatibility constraints of mobile users,software service providers Maximize the utility,thereby solving the moral hazard problem caused by the asymmetric information of the contracting parties.The experimental results show that the optimal contract incentive mechanism in the asymmetric information scenario proposed by this method can achieve a win-win situation for the interests of software service providers and mobile users.(2)Aiming at the problem that most mobile users are unwilling to participate in long-term mobile crowdsourcing tasks,this paper proposes a two-phase mobile crowdsourcing network dynamic contract incentive mechanism based on reputation strategy.Based on the establishment of a dynamic contract model between software service providers and mobile users,a reputation strategy is introduced.The incentives of the contract and the implicit incentives of the reputation strategy are used together to encourage MUs to complete the long-term crowdsourcing tasks.The optimization strategy is formulated by adjusting the reputation coefficient to maximize the SP's utility.The impact of MUs' risk attitude and reputation impact factors on the incentive mechanism is studied through experiments.Numerical simulation results demonstrate that the optimal reputation-based contract design scheme is efficient in the Mobile crowdsourcing networks.This paper proposes a dynamic contract incentive mechanism based on reputation strategy for mobile crowdsourcing networks to encourage mobile users to actively participate in long-term mobile crowdsourcing tasks,improve the performance of mobile crowdsourcing networks,and provide new ideas for the development of mobile crowdsourcing networks.