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Research On Incentive Mechanism For Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Based On Contract Theory

Posted on:2019-03-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2428330569978634Subject:Power system and its automation
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The cooperative spectrum sharing can effectively improve the spectrum utilization efficiency through cooperation among wireless nodes.However,due to the mobility of wireless users,the fading effect of wireless channels,and the privacy of network information,the problem of asymmetric network information has been caused.Therefore,this paper is devoted to research on cooperative spectrum sharing incentive mechanism based on contract theory to solve the above problems.For the problem of dual information asymmetry in collaborative spectrum sharing,a cooperative spectrum sharing incentive mechanism design method based on contract theory is proposed.Taking into account the self-privation of relay nodes and the dual information asymmetry characteristics,based on the establishment of the model of source nodes and relay nodes,under the premise of guaranteeing the individual rational constraints and incentive compatibility constraints of relay nodes,to obtain the maximum utility of the source nodes.To solve the dual information asymmetry problem of the relay node's private capability information and relay effort.The experimental results show that the optimal contract incentive mechanism under the dual information asymmetrical scenario proposed by this method can ensure the realization of cooperative spectrum sharing while achieving the win-win of the source node and the relay node.Considering that the distance between the source node and the relay node is far from being able to achieve supervision,a design method of incentive mechanism based on relay supervision is proposed.On the basis of establishing the model of source node and relay node,through the introduction of a supervision node,two incentive design methods based on information supervision and behavior supervision are studied.The incentive mechanism based on information supervision is based on the premise of acquiring relay node capability information,and by designing the optimal incentive contract to solve the asymmetric problem of the relay node's efforts.The incentive mechanism based on behavior supervision under the premise of relaying hard work behavior,through the design of the optimal incentive contract,to solve the asymmetric problem of private capability information.The experimental results show that the optimal contract design using the monitoring strategy can improve the spectrum utilization better.Considering that the dynamic characteristics of wireless nodes lead to the problem that long-term transactions between primary and secondary users are difficult to achieve,this paper proposes a cooperative spectrum sharing dynamic incentive mechanism design method based on contract theory.Based on the establishment of the primary user and the secondary user model,under the premise of guaranteeing the secondary user's personal rationality constraints and incentive compatibility constraints,a two-stage collaborative spectrum sharing dynamic contract incentive design is proposed to obtain the primary user utility maximization and thus solve the problem.The time-varying problem of private user's private capability information avoids the additional transaction costs incurred by the primary user who frequently selects relay nodes.Experimental results show that the proposed dynamic contract incentive mechanism can effectively improve the cooperative spectrum sharing performance and enable the primary user to achieve higher utility.This paper proposes a static and dynamic incentive mechanism for cooperative spectrum sharing based on contract theory,which provides a new idea for improving the utilization of wireless spectrum,improving the performance of wireless communication systems and achieving sharing of spectrum resources.
Keywords/Search Tags:cooperative spectrum sharing, asymmetric information, contract theory, dynamic incentive
PDF Full Text Request
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