Research On The Influence Mechanism Of The Media Supervision On Mergers And Acquisitions

As an extralegal system,does media attention have governance effect? What is the mechanism? thisSome problems have become the hot topics in current financial studies.In the existing studies,scholars have found that the motivation of media supervision is the pursuit of "sensationalism" and the negative externality of media reports.The media through the dissemination of information,reputation mechanism,administrative intervention mechanism and market pressure mechanism on mergers and acquisitions;The improved quality of corporate disclosure in the wake of the media reports has helped the company abandon plans for acquisitions that were seen as less promising.Although more and more attention has been paid to the importance of media supervision,there are only a few literatures(mostly empirical papers)studying how media supervision can improve corporate information transparency and thus influence mergers and acquisitions,and few in-depth studies on specific cases.In addition,most of the literature starts from the official official accounts of the company itself,but there is still a gap in the existing literature on the influence of external "we media" reports on information disclosure and mergers and acquisitions.On the basis of sorting out the existing literature,this paper takes elio shares as an example to analyze how the media supervision mechanism exerts its influence in specific cases.The results show that the media supervision mechanism can be divided into direct path and indirect path.From the direct path,the media has strong ability of search and analysis of professional team,can collect the relevant information of listed companies,and for the information processing and finishing,through information dissemination mechanism,the information disclosed to the public resources,improve the transparency of the listed company,reduce the cost of information users to search information,so as to ease the Downs(1957)proposed by the "Rational ignore Paradox"(Rational Ignorance Paradox).From the indirect perspective,the media's reports on the negative information of the enterprise will affect the interests of the company's stakeholders,who will take actions to safeguard their own interests,improve the efficiency of the supervision of the regulatory level and affect the investment behavior of investors.Through the combined action of administrative intervention mechanism,reputation mechanism and market pressure mechanism,the supervision of media can exert practical influence on the company'sm&a decision.With the rise of microblog,WeChat and other we-media,we-media play an increasingly important supervisory role in the capital market by virtue of its advantages in transmission speed and scope.In order to further explore the influence of "we media" in this case,this paper takes BBS as an example to compare the influence of traditional media and "we media" in this case.The full use of media supervision will be conducive to the benign development of China's m&a market,which requires the joint efforts of regulators,investors and listed companies.