Reserch On Healthcare Supplychain With A GPO Based On Supplychain Contract

The medical and health industry has always been an very important aspect for almost every country.With the improvement of medical techniques,the cost of medicines is also increasing.It is also regarded as the top priority of the reform by the state.It can be seen from the continuous reform over the years.Group Purchasing Organization(GPO),as a kind of medicine purchasing method with some practical experience abroad,has been gradually developed in China.In this paper,the research object is the pharmaceutical supply chain with GPO.The equilibrium results of the pharmaceutical supply chain with GPO in different situations are studied by game theory and supply chain contract.In this paper,a three-party supply chain purchasing from the manufacturer through GPO is modeled,the order and rules of the game are designed,and the game process is deduced to obtain the equilibrium results.The main research contents and results are as follows:(1)Proposed the improvement of membership fee charging mechanism,and proved that this improvement can expand the scale of GPO Service hospitals by deducing and solving the equilibrium results.Considering both CAF(contract management fee)charged to manufacturers and membership fee charged to medical institutions,this paper improves the membership fee charging mechanism,charging fewer membership fees to hospitals with larger demand,and finds that the impact of this improvement on revenue balance point can make GPO attract more hospitals to adopt.Buying,but smaller hospitals may pay higher procurement costs in the process.(2)Considering the current situation of GPO application in China,this paper considers the game between GPO and hospitals with large demand under the revenue sharing contract.This paper considers the situation that GPO and hospitals with larger demand share revenue to form a cooperative game,in order to explore the impact of GPO on the overall supply chain under the aggregated cooperative mode.After introducing revenue sharing into large hospitals and GPO for cooperative game,we can find that the introduction of revenue sharing and the change of revenue sharing rate will not affect the cost of large hospitals,but will lead to higher procurement costs for smaller hospitals due to the increase of GPO pr:icing.(3)Consider the game results of all parties in the supply chain under the condition of incomplete information symmetry,and design an incentive mechanism to promote manufacturers to disclose the truth.Fixed procurement costs such as negotiation and manpower will be incurred when purchasing from GPO,franchised manufacturer and non-franchised manufacturer,which will be transferred from the supplier to the purchaser,that is,the hospital.However,this cost information is the private information of the supplier.Therefore,due to the trend of maximizing profits,the manufacturer may lie about this cost information in the game process.This topic will model the supply chain under this situation.It can be found that in this case,regardless of the real type of fixed procurement costs,manufacturers tend to report higher fixed procurement costs in order to obtain higher returns,but at the same time,GPO profits will suffer losses.And the operation cost of the whole supply chain will rise with it.Therefore,an incentive mechanism is designed in this chapter.When manufacturers report high-type fixed purchase cost information,they need to pay GPO a compensation payment value that meets certain constraints.Under this mechanism,manufacturers tend to report the real fixed purchase cost,so that the operation cost of the whole supply chain returns to normal.Level of equilibrium results.